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SOME ASPECTS OF PAYMENT BY NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
FRIEDRICH KESSLER,- EDWARD H. LEVI,
EDWIN E. FERGUSON*
I

T

HE scenes are laid in London, New York, Berlin, and Paris.

The

plot begins with a debtor's giving his creditor a negotiable instrument
in"payment" of the debt. Complications are introduced when the creditor fails to perfect his rights on the instrument, and yet, naturally
enough, wishes to collect his debt. Initially both debtor and creditor
are satisfied when the negotiable instrument is given in "payment." If
it is a time instrument, the debtor has obtained an extension of credit.
The creditor, on the other hand, has placed his claim in liquid form; he
may realize upon it by discounting the instrument. The Anglo-American,
German, and French legal systems, in their own way, attempt to safeguard both the interests of the debtor and the creditor. The creditor
will not be allowed to sue the debtor until the maturity of the instrument;'
otherwise the debtor would be deprived of his credit. The creditor may
not bring action without producing the instrument or at least showing
that it has been destroyed; 3 otherwise the debtor might be compelled to
tiLecturer in Law, Yale University School of Law.
*Sterling Fellow, Yale School of Law, member of the Illinois bar.
*Sterling Fellow, Yale School of Law, member of the Iowa bar.
1. The bill of exchange, in its origin, mainly performed a payment function; it was
the means of avoiding cash transfers particularly to foreign countries. Today this payment
function is performed by the check for inland transactions, and by the bill and the cable
transfer for foreign payments. The bill of exchange is used mainly for the extension
of credit.
2. Anglo-American law: Walton v. Maskell, 14 L. J. 54 (Ex. 1844); Cohen v. Hales,
47 L. J. 496 (Q. B. 1878); 3 DA=IEL, NEGOTtBLE L',Srmaxers (7th ed. 1933) § 1463.
French law: Lescot, De l'influence de l'Fgnsionou de i'endosscment d'u c letire de change
CA L
sur l'obligation prlexistente du dibiteur cambiire (1932) 41 AI;A;rXs DD DRO? COa
105, 116.
German law: Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, Dec. 5, 1916, 17 DAs Racnr (1917) No. 534;
msFmFs
(13th ed. 1934) Art. 89 Anm. 25;
STAu-B-STPANz, KommaINTAR zum WEcns
2 GRUEHuT, HEmBUMc DES W ECHsERMCRTS (1897) 302. It must, however, not be forgotten that if the creditor presents the unaccepted instrument to the drawee for acceptance,
and the latter refuses to accept, or when the drawee before acceptance, goes into bankruptcy,
or becomes insolvent, the holder acquires an immediate right of recourse against the debtordrawer or debtor-indorser. Wechselgesetz June 21, 1933, Art. 43 (2). Such a provision
qualifies the suspension effect. 2 Gnumn_,r, op. cit. supra at 305.
3. Anglo-American law: Looney v. District of Columbia, 113 U. S. 258 (1885); Dan.
nelly v. District of Columbia, 119 U. S. 339 (1886); Bill v. Porter, 9 Conn. 23 (1831);
Nichols v. Michael, 23 N. Y. 264 (1861); Davis v. Reilly, 66 L. J.844 (Q. B. 1893). See
1373
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pay his debt again to a third person who had bought the instrument. 4 On
the other hand, the creditor may prove his claim merely by introducing
the instrument in evidence and thereby gain certain procedural advantages.' The creditor and the debtor, being ignorant even of their own law,
have spoken of this transaction as a "payment." But the Anglo-American, German, and French systems of law agree that the transaction was
merely a "conditional payment," unless the debtor and creditor clearly
indicated that they intended the instrument to be absolute payment, a
situation which is, however, seldom found." "Conditional payment" is, of
Crowe v. Clay, 9 Ex. 604 (1854). A voluntary destruction of the instrument will bar
the right on the underlying obligation. Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 14 N. J. L. 178 (Sup.
Ct. 1883).
German law: Reichsgericht, Sept. 16, 1903, 32 JurisTisCHE WocnENscuRr (1903) 375;
Oberlandesgericht Dresden, February 13, 1918, 19 Lzrzioma ZEITsCsITr
(1918) 1195; for
further details see 1 Buxrr, KomzrENTA zvar DZUTsaaEN Scnzcxosmz (1929) 303, 304.
See further GzAN W mcnsaoEsEz; Artt. 39, 90; G.xAN ZTVILPROzUSSORDN'UNO §§ 947
et seq.
Fvench law: THALLER-PERCEROU, TRAiTi EL MENTAIRE DE DROIT COMI.IERCIAL (7th ed.
1925) §§ 1504, 1518 et seq.; CODE DE Com=aca= art. 140-146 (new).
4. Payment is merely a personal defense in all legal systems here considered. BiorLow,
BiLLS, NOTES AND CnECKS, (3rd ed. 1928) § 554; NORTON, BIUrs "D NOTES (4th ed. 1914)
353; BYLES, BrLLs (19th ed. 1931) 223; STAuB-S ANz, op. cit. supra note 2, at Art. 17
Anm. 57g; THmALER-PERCEROU, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 1469 et seq.

5. See N. I. L. §§ 11, 17, 24; BYLES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 125. The German law,
but not the French, provides for a summary bills of exchange procedure available to
holders of bills, notes and checks. ZrvmPRozEssoanNuo §§ 592 et seq., §§ 445, 708 (4),
713 (2) ; Reichsgericht April 22, 1932, 136 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivllsachen 137,
6. Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 928 (K. B. 1702); Standard Investment Co. v. Town
of Snow Hill, 78 F. (2d) 33 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Farmers Exchange Bank v. Greil Bros.
Co., 17 Ala. App. 287, 84 So. 427 (1919); Rice Growers Credit Corp. v. Walker, 185
Ark. 896, 50 S.W. (2d) 619 (1932); Swan v. Smith, 102 Cal. App. 541, 283 Pac. 829
(1930); Bassett v. Merchants' Trust Co., 118 Conn. 586, 173 At. 777 (1934); Sulter v.
Citizens' Bank and Trust Co., 51 Ga. App. 798, 181 S.E. 694 (1935); Shuman v. Arsht,
249 Ill. App. 562 (1928); Hirleman v. Nickels, 193 Minn. 139, 258 N. W. 13 (1934);
Raines v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 340, 171 S.E. 360 (1933); Baker v. State Highway Dep't.,
166 S.C. 481, 165 S.E. 197 (1932); see also BYLEs, Bmts (19th ed. 1931) 303; DANIEL,
NEGoTIA=LE INsTRumENTs (7th ed. 1933) § 1458.

In a few states, there is a presumption of absolute payment: Duvall v. Ranson and
Randolph Co., 90 Ind. App. 605, 169 N. E. 537 (1930); Dow v. Poore, 272 Mass. 223,
172 N. E. 82 (1930); Rutland Ry. Light and Power Co. v. Williams, 90 Vt. 276, 98 Ati.
85 (1916). But it does not obtain where the creditor possesses other security: Spitz v.
Morse, 104 Me. 447, 72 Al. 178 (1908); Rosenberg v. Robbins, 208 Mass. 45, 194 N. E.
291 (1935). Nor where the instrument is a check: Gordon v. Keene, 118 Me. 269, 107
Ati. 849 (1920); Dutton v. Bennett, 262 Mass. 39, 159 N. E. 524 (1928). See cases
collected in Note (1912) 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1-113 for a comprehensive perspective of
payment by commercial paper, particularly in regard to presumptions of conditional and
absolute payment.
The presumption of absolute payment is sometimes raised if a third party's instrument
is transferred for a present debt. Partee v. Bedford, 51 Miss. 84 (1875); Hall v. Stevens,
116 N. Y. 201, 22 N. E. 374 (1889) ; Blum v. Sadofsky, 86 N. Y. Supp. 22 (App. Div. 1904) ;
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course, a tag phrase. It means that even though the creditor has taken
the negotiable instrument, the original debt still exists, and under some
circumstances, the creditor may resort to it.7 Since the underlying obligation survives the "payment" by negotiable instrument, it will not be
necessary to incorporate its terms into the instrument, thus, perhaps,
destroying its negotiability.8 It means further that any collateral secuChalloner v. Boyington, 91 Wis. 27, 64 N. W. 422 (1895). In England the presmption
of absolute payment obtains in the cases of transfer by delivery only of a bill of exchange
or note for goods, other instruments or money; such transfer is considered a fale unlesa
a contrary intent is found. Emly v. Lye, 15 East. 7 (K. B. 1812); Camidge v. Allenby,
6 B. & C. 373 (K. B. 1827); BYrEs, Buas (19th ed. 1931) 172. Similarly, in the case
of a precedent debt, if the creditor has the option to take cash or a third party's bill,
the original debtor is discharged upon the creditor's taking the bill. Strong v. Hart,
6 B. & C. 160 (K. B. 1827); Rogers v. Calgary, 56 Can. S. C. R. 165 (1917); sEe Marsh
v. Peddar, 3 East. 257 (K. B. 1815).
For the German rules as to conditional payment, see Reichsoberhandelzgericht, January
13, 1872, 4 ENTsc aMUNerir DEs REic soBmnsa.DEroGmRics 365, 371; Reichsoberhandelsgericht, November 25, 1875, 18 Entscheidungen des Relchsoberhandelsgerichts 390; Reichsgericht, November 3, 1925, 112 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in ZiviLsachen 61; STAiSrassrz, Koa
NrAR zum WcnsraGrsmrz (13th ed. 1934) Art. 89 Anmerkung 24 b; Bnra,
1 Koza=Anrmes zum D 'ursc= SCHE=CGESErZ (1929) Anhang zu § 4 Anmerkung 6;
Lipschitz, Weckhen Einfluss hat die Praejudisierung elnes rahiungs-halbcr gegebennen
Wechsels oder Schecks auf die eugrundeliegende Katualforderung (1924) 70 GnUCMors
BEITrAm
E 482. Even if the debtor pays with a check certified by the Reichsbank which
gives the creditor a direct cause of action against the Reichsbank, the result is the same.
B=n-T, op. cit. supra, at Anhang zu § 4 Anmerkung 14.
For the French rules see: Cour de Cassation, May 8, 1850, D.,oz JU1W~nr ;cE (18S0)
1, 158; Cour de Cassation, April 28, 1900, DArL.oz JMWi RUnFuICE (1901) 1, 17. See further:
Aubin, De IlInfluence de la Creation et de Id Transtnission de Billets a Ordre out de Lettres
de Change s=r les Rapports Juridiques Interieurs Existents entre lei Partics (1899) 13

AsxrA.s DE Dnorr Concr.

294 et seq.; Perrau, De la non Application de la Prescrip-

tion Quinqjuenac a rAction du Contract Originaireen Matlere de Lettres de Change (1924)
de DRon" Co a
n.c.A 1; Lescot, De lInfluence do 'Emmniiorn ou de
33 ANN-s
l'Endossenent d'unc Lettre de Change sur I'Obligation Preexistent du Debiteur Carmbiaire
(1932) 41 id. 105.

The problem whether or not an instrument is taken as payment is distinct from the
problem whether or not it later becomes payment. For instance, an instrument not taken
as payment may become such if the collecting bank, acting as agent for the holder, should

take the drawee's personal check without previous authorization by the drawer of the bill.
Likewise, it is sometimes held that an instrument which originally was not payment
becomes such when the holder is negligent in performing his duties on the instrument.
The latter case directly affects our problem; the former, arbitrarily or otherwise, is excluded.
7. Hughes v. Wheeler, 8 Cowen 77 (N. Y. 1827); Wooden v. Frazee, 6 Jones & Spen.
190 (N. Y. Super. 1874); Taylor v. Wilson, 52 Mass. 44 (1846).
8. See BY-as, op. cit. supra note 4, at 97 et seq.
This is particularly true under the Continental laws which do not allow to the parties
the same leeway in framing the instrument as the Anglo-American law. The incorporation
of an acceleration clause, for instance, would make the instrument non-negotiable. On the
Continental law see: STAuB-SrAxrz, op. cit. supra note 2, at Art. 33 Anm. 8, 9; KssrLin,
WEmcsES.GEsErz (1933) 15 et seq.; THA.ram-Pmcmou, op. dt. supra note 3, at § 1300.
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rity for the original debt is not released when the instrument is given.0
And it may mean that even if the statute of limitations has barred action
on the instrument, the creditor may still sue on the underlying obligation,
if the statute of limitations has not run as to it.'0 The phrase "conditional payment" further implies that when payment becomes "absolute"
the underlying obligation will be gone."
To the American Realist, it may sound allegorical and' unfunctional to
speak of "conditional payment" and the "continued subsistence of the underlying obligation." It may seem even stranger to find people worrying
about whether the creditor has, after taking the instrument, two rights
against his debtor, one on the instrument and another on the underlying obligation, or whether he has only one right on a claim which is a
merger of rights on the debt and on the instrument. The lawyer has
learned from the Realists that such theories are useful merely as chants
or symbols to make decisions look respectably rational, and he knows
that they must be watched with deep suspicion, as abstractions designed
to wean him from his proper diet of cases and facts.
Indeed, the Anglo-American law during recent years has not worried
much about the nature of this creditor's right, and in fact has never been
particularly explicit about the matter at any time in its history. Ames
did contend that "a bill is a merger, absolute or temporary, of a pre,
existing claim," but he was quick to point out that if the merger theory
is taken seriously then many cases have been wrongly decided. 12 Story
concluded that the instrument was "at most . . . only prima facie evidence of satisfaction, rendering it necessary that the party receiving the
substituted note should account for it, before he will be entitled to recover
upon the original debt or note." 3 According to Byles, "the original debt
A few French decisions have tried to reach a result similar to incorporation of the acceleration clause in the instrument by deciding that the rights of the original creditor run
with the instrument. Paris, January 4, 1899, DAILoz, JURISPRUDENCE (1900) 2.121 with the
interesting note of Percerou.

9. French law: Tn=Ra-PEacERou, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 1300. Personal sureties
are, however, discharged. CODE CIVIL art. 2038.
German law: 2 GRUENHUT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 297.
10. Lacey v. Hall, 6 La. Ann. 1 (1851). Cf. Lupkin v. Story, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 605,
134 S. W. 398 (1911); Stuart v. Westerheide, 144 Oka. 150, 289 Pac. 721 (1930). But
see Farrand v. Yates, 249 1. App. 180 (1928).
French law: Cour de Cassation, May 8, 1850, DA.Loz JURISPRUDENCE (1850) 1, 58;
April 28, 1900, id. (1901Y 1, 17. See CAPrrANT, DzaLA AUsE DES OBLIGATIONS (2nd cd.
1924) § 189. But cf. Thaller (1901) DALLOz JURisPRUDENcE 1, 17.
German law: Reichsgericht, September 26, 1899, 44 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerlchts In
Zivilsachen 80.

11.

See cases in which there is a presumption of absolute payment, cited note 6 supra.

12. 2 AmEs, CASES ON Bmts AND NOTES (1894) 874-875. Cf. NORTON, op, cit. supra
note 4, at 426, where it is said that "a simple executory contract is not extinguished by
the acceptance of another."
13. STORY, PROMISSORY NOTES (2nd ed. 1847) 520-521.
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still remains, but the remedy for it is suspended till maturity of the
instrument in the hands of the creditors.' 4 With such conflicts among
the sages as to the nature of the creditor's right, it would be hard to convince our Realistic lawyer that present theories of its legal import were
anything more than scholastic vagaries not soundly rooted in the facts
of cases, and therefore not even useful as magic with which to bemuse
judges in the ceremonial of a trial.
One feels sure, however, that this skepticism of the American legal
Realist would appear heretical to a German scholar-lawyer, who enjoys
theories without worrying too much about their reality, and takes them
very seriously. To him it would be clear that the creditor bad two causes
of action against the debtor, one on the instrument and one on the
original debt.' A French lawyer might be somewhat embarrassed if be
were asked whether in France the creditor had two causes of action or
only one on a merger of the former claim on the debt with the claim on
the instrument, 6 though with the practical logic of his legal system he
would know that other devices could be found to supply any deficiency
inherent in either theory, and, with an inconsistency which may or may
not be characteristic of his country, he would be more or less content to
reach results incompatible with either theory.
But in London, New York, Berlin, and Paris, the creditor who has taken
the negotiable instrument has much the same rights. For a moment we can
agree that the legal doctrine is irrelevant. But only for a moment. As
soon as we add the complicating factor that the creditor has failed to perfect his rights on the instrument and yet wishes to collect his debt, legal
doctrine becomes important. The words and the wind of the doctrine,
and its inner logic as a fragment of distinct legal systems, now begin to
control the result. For the same facts are somewhat differently adjudicated in the four countries, and a comparative study of the legal variations on this simple theme may illuminate a dark corner in the law of
negotiable instruments.
Thus, the plot has developed in this form: the creditor has taken a
negotiable instrument from his debtor in "payment" of the debt, but he
has failed to perfect his rights on the instrument. He may not have presented the instrument for payment, or for acceptance, within a reasonable
14. BYLES, supra note 4, at 303. See also 2 PARso s, NoTLs ,m Buxs (1873) 154;
Cm='x, Bims oF EXCHnGE (11th ed. 1878) 127.
z (1933)
15. See 2 GRum-HU, op. cit. supra note 2, at 302; KESSLF-n, WECS=EsLC
66; MUELUM-ERZBAcH, DLmo-cns HAND sECmH (3rd ed. 1928) 507, 505. But see WimXm,
,n.axmxc .B GRuNWL.AGEz (1901) 91, 124, 182.
z
DEm WEcnsEL uN s=
16. The two decisions of the Cour de Cassation referred to note 10 supra have been
often interpreted and criticized as being based on a two causes of action theory. TmLLr,
loc. cit. supra note 10. According to most textwriters, the creditor has only one cauze of
action, the original claim being merged with that arising out of the instrument. Tnxu%=nPERcEmoU, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 1662.
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time; or, a dishonor having occurred, he may have failed to obtain a protest of the instrument or to give due notice to the proper parties on the
instrument.
May a creditor thus guilty of laches get a court and a
policeman to force his debtor to pay him notwithstanding the laches? 8
The answer to the question varies from country to country, with the nature of the instrument used for "payment," and the capacity, if any, in
which the debtor became a party thereto.
II
We shall be concerned with five factual variations upon the basic plot:
(1) the debtor gives his own promigsory note or acceptance to the creditor; (2) the debtor draws or indorses a bill or check which is accepted or
certified, or indorses a promissory note, and gives it to the creditor; (3)
the debtor is the drawer of an unaccepted bill or an uncertified check; (4)
the debtor indorses an unaccepted bill or uncertified check to the creditor; (5) the creditor takes a third party's instrument on which the
debtor's signature does not appear.
The systems of doctrine in terms of which these cases must be elaborated and solved are simple and distinct. The background of the AngloAmerican theory lies in the reasoning of Clerke v. Mundall.19 The creditor had taken a bill of exchange from his debtor who had indorsed the bill,
but the creditor had apparently failed to make due presentment. Chief
Justice Holt held that the creditor could recover on the underlying obligation, for, "A bill without payment of money, shall never go in satisfaction of a precedent debt or contract, if 'tis not part of the contract."
Inherent in the decision is a distinction beween cases in which the creditor takes the instrument for a precedent debt, and those in which he takes
it for a present debt. If the instrument is taken for a present debt, according to Holt, laches on the instrument will prohibit a suit on the earlier
17. See N. L L. §§ 70, 89, 144; BiLs or ExcaANO AcT, 45 and 46 VicT. c. 61 §§
40 (1), 42, 45, 48, 86 (1), 87 (2), 89 (1882); GmurAzN WVEcsELoEsFTz Artt. 42 (1), 23,
34, 43, 44, 45, 53; G
ym=Ar
ScuEcxGEsnz Artt. 29, 31, 40, 41, 42. FRaNCrU CODe DE
Comnrm artt. 147-149, 156, 124(6), 132; D6cret unifiant le droit en matire de cheques

(30 octobre 1935) artt. 29, 31, 40-42. The German and French statutes are based on the
Geneva Uniform Codes on Bills, Notes, and Checks. Neither such statutes nor the codes
deal with rights on the underlying obligation. As to the uniform rules adopted by such
codes and the amendatory powers reserved to the signatory nations, see Hudson and Feller,
The International Unification of Laws Concerning Bills of Exchange (1930) 44 HaV L.
Rnv. 333; Feller, The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks (1932) 45 HAaV.
L. REv. 668.

On the necessity for protest see N. I. L. § 152; Bimrs or ExcumzAm AcT § 51 (2); GERMAN
WEcusELGEsETz Art. 44; FRENcH Coow Dn CoimsRcE Art. 148A.

18. For the purposes of this paper, laches may be defined as failure to make due
presentment for acceptance (if necessary) or for payment, or to give due notice of dishonor,
or to make proper protest (when necessary).
19. 3 Salk. 68 (1694).
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underlying obligation. Indeed Holt did not limit his statement to cases in
which the creditor had been guilty of laches, but stated broadly that "in
such case B (the debtor) is discharged tho' the money should never be
paid, for the bill itself is payment." One may gather that Lord Holt was
thinking in terms of a dichotomy between absolute and conditional payment. He apparently thought that if an instrument is taken for a present
debt, then the presumption was that it was given in absolute payment, and
that, therefore, discharge on the underlying obligation results. But on
the other hand, where the instrument was taken for a precedent debt it
was intended merely as conditional payment, and the creditor's right on
the underlying obligation is preserved.
Lord Holt's decision, however, has long been forgotten. -° Since his
time it has usually been assumed that discharge on the underlying obligation results in all cases, where the creditor has been guilty of laches, -'

whether the debt be present or precedent. Kyd blames the Statute of
Anne, which was passed chiefly to give some of the attributes of negotia-

bility to promissory notes, for this change of heart towards the creditor
who has failed to perfect his right on the instrument and now desires to

recover on the debt.22 The Statute of Anne contained a section providing
that "if any person accept a Bill of Exchange for and in satisfaction of
any former debt, or sum of money formerly due to him, this shall be

accounted and esteemed a full and complete payment of such debt, if such
person accepting of any such bill for his debt do not take his due course

to obtain payment of it, by endeavoring to get the same accepted and paid,
and make his protest according to the directions of the Act, either for
non-acceptance or non-payment."23 But the section was on its face confined to bills given for antecedent debts, and by construction could have

24
been limited to time bills;
and as a matter of fact, the section seems to
25

have had little effect.

20. See CB=TY, Bmis or EXCANGE (1799) 131.
21. Cmrr, BnLts or EXCHANGE (11th ed. 1878) 248-249.
22. KyD, Bms or EXCHAGE (1791) 110, 111.
23. 3 & 4 ANE, c. 9, § 7 (1704).
24. See Cnr, Bmns or ExcnmsGa (1799) 131, note c. But see the defendant's plea
in Kearslake v. Morgan, 5 D. & E. 513, 517 (K. B. 1794), where it was argued that the
Statute of Anne puts promissory notes on an equal footing with inland bills and that § 7
was therefore applicable to a note. The plea was sustained, but whether, on this ground
or on others does not appear.
25. The few cases found cite it in mere dictum discussion. Gallagher v. Roberts, 9 Fed.
Cas. No. 5195 (C. C. D. Pa. 180S); Hamilton v. Cunningham, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 5978
(E. D. Va. 1828); Jennison v. Parker, 7 Mich. 355 (1859) (concurring opinion). Or in
pointing out that its rule is not applicable. Swinyard v. Bowes, 5 M. & S. 62 (K. B. 1816)
(where the debtor was not a party to the instrument); Coleman v. Lewis, 183 Mazz.
485, 67 N. E. 603 (1903) (where the instrument w-as given as collateral). See Riedman
v. Macht, 98 Ind. App. 124, 183 N. E. 807 (1932) and cases cited therein to the effect that
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In Germany a "two causes of action" theory is accepted, which holds
that notwithstanding the "payment," the creditor may always bring action on the underlying obligation as well as on the instrument. Thus it
is well settled that the creditor may still sue the debtor-drawer of the
instrument used in "payment" on the underlying obligation even if because of his laches he has lost his right to sue on the instrument. In such
a case, if any injury was caused the debtor-drawer by the laches, his sole
remedy is by a counterclaim for damages suffered.2 However, where
the debtor is the indorser of the instrument, it as yet remains uncertain
whether the creditor who has been guilty of laches may bring action on
the underlying obligation, possibly because the unaccepted bill does not
play an important role in modern German business practice.2 7 In France
the courts have not dealt with the subject of whether the creditor guilty
of laches may have recourse to the underlying obligation. Only a few
legal writers mention it. The famous treatise of Lyon-Caen et Renault
apparently deals with the problem only with respect to checks, and states
briefly that the creditor who is guilty of laches is deemed to have received
payment.28 A recent article in a leading commercial law journal takes
issue with this opinion and invokes the two causes of action theory. "
The writer contends that the creditor does not necessarily lose his original
claim, although, because of his neglect, he may have lost his right of recourse on the instrument, and would be merely subject to a counterclaim
for damages if his failure to present caused any injury to his debtor.8 0
Perhaps the reason for the absence of an exhaustive French discussion of
the problem may lie in the fact that under French Law the creditor
guilty of laches nevertheless may have a right of action against the
drawer or drawee. 1
First and Second Variations: The first two situations can be dealt
notes were not negotiable at the common law. This view precludes the idea of the adoption
of the Statute of Anne as part of the law merchant. In any event, the Statute of Anne
was repealed in 1882. BILLS op ExcHANGE AcT, 45 & 46 VicT., C. 61, Schedule II (1882).
26. STAUB-SA1xZ, op. cit. supra note 2, at Art. 89 Am. 26a.
Emphasis upon the rights arising out of the underlying obligation may be due to the
fact that the holder's duties with respect to the instrument are absolute, and not merely
to use reasonable diligence. See CHALMRS, BILLS OF EXCHANGE (10th ed. 1932) 369-370,
27. FTELmA N, DAs RECHT Aut Dx DECxUNO BEIm GEZoGEvEN WECnSEL (1932) 67.
28. 4 LYON-CAEN ET RENA-uLT, DROIT COiMRaCIAL (5th ed. 1925) § 585.
29. This may he traced to the two decisions of the Cour de Cassation, cited note 10, supra.
30. Lescot, supra note 2, at 112 et seq. But see 2 LACOUR Er BOUTERON, Pnfclg DI;

DROiT COmMERcAL (3rd ed. 1925) § 1234.
31. See p. 1394 infra. France has recently enacted the uniform codes on bills and
checks as drafted by the Geneva conventions. Adoption of such codes has not, however,

affected the rights of the holder as they existed under the former French law, for France
has retained her peculiar rules regarding them.
DER GENTER VERTRAEGE (1934) 145 et seq.

HuPxA, DAs Er uEarrcna WECISELRECUT
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with briefly. If the debtor is the maker of a note3 - or the acceptor of the

creditor's bill, the debtor is not discharged by the creditor's laches, but
remains liable as primary bbligor on the instrument as well as on the

original debt, until the period of prescription has run.P If, however,
the note or acceptance is domiciled, the legal result corresponds closely

to the solution of cases in which the debtor is drawer and may therefore be more adequately treated later. If the debtor draws or indorses a
bill or check which is accepted or certified, or indorses a promissory note
of a third party, the creditor, even if he has lost his right of recourse
against the debtor-indorser on the instrument and on his original
claim,231 will have a right on the instrument against the maker, acceptor,
or certifier who remain liable despite laches (at least under the American

law). 3 Hence except in cases where the statute of limitations has run
on the instrument, or where the maker or acceptor has become insolvent,
.

32. Promissory notes are used but seldom in Germany. STAB-SmT'uz, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 598; FmEarNN, DAs RuH Aur Dxn DCErcx o nant G.zoo=,; Wycusm.
(1932) 67, note 2.
33. N. I. L. § 70; BrrLs or EXCH.iuGE Acr §§ 52, 87; Lacey v. Hall, supra note 10;
GEna.q WEcsEGEsE-Z Artt. 53, 70 (1), 7S; FRnMcH CODE DE Com-cE artt. 170 (2),
187, 189.
33a. Laches will discharge the drawer or indorser of an accepted bill on the underlying
debt. Allen v. King, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 226 (C. C. D. Mich. 1846); Grade v. Sandford,
9 Ark. 233 (1848); Marburg v. Canfield, 4 Mart. N. S. 539 (La. 1826); Stam v. Kerr,
31 Miss. 199 (1856); Cochran v. Wheeler, 7 N. H. 202 (1834); Hawley, Dodd & Co. v.
Jette and Clark, 10 Ore. 31 (1831); Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunt. 130 (C. P. 1310). And
the indorser of a note. Orange Screen Co. v. Holmes, 103 N. J. L. 560, 133 AU. 105
(Sup. Ct. 1927); Harris v. Shipway, Bull. N. P. 182 (1744); Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C.
373 (K. B. 1827). But not if the indorser of the note has not been injured: Kane v.
Eastman, 238 Pac. 819 (Cal. 1930); Kephart v. Butcher, 17 Iowa 240 (1864); Shipman
v. Cook, 16 N. J. Eq. 251 (Ch. 1863); Heyward v. Empire State Sugar Co., 105 App.
Div. 21, 93 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1905). Cf. Long v. Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co., 38 Ohio App.
546, 177 N. E. 55 (1931). Laches will discharge the drawer or indorser of a bill or note
on the instrument. Supra note 17. If a check is certified by the holder, the drawer and
indorsers are discharged regardless of laches. N. I. L. § 188. And it would seem that
laches would discharge the indorser of a check certified at the drawer's request before
delivery, if the fact that the indorser of an accepted bill is discharged by reason of laihes,
is borne in mind. But whether the drawer is absolutely discharged will depend on whether
he is to be treated as a drawer under § 186, or as an indorser. Apparently, however, the
point has not been dealt with.
34. N. L L. § 187. See also note 33 supra.
Both the English and the French law do not recognize certification. See Tmu.mmPERcEaou, op. cit. supra note 3 at §§ 1652 bLS 1646 (note). The "visa" used to zome
extent in French banking practice is not a real certification, for the bank assumes no
obligation to pay the check. BoumoN., LE CHeQUE (1924) 331 et seq, 344. Certification
and the rights arising therefrom are much restricted in German law. Only the Reichbank
has the power to certify. This certification moreover is not an acceptance for the Rechsbank is discharged if the check is not duly presented for payment. See Knssrxn, KO . _ntaT,
zum ScimcoG~sE'z (1934) 47 et seq., 180. See also Steffen and Starr, A Blueprinl for e
Certified Check (1935) 13 N. C. L. REV. 450.

HeinOnline -- 45 Yale L. J. 1381 1935-1936

1382

YALE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

the problem of whether the creditor may still collect from his debtor,
despite his laches, does not have the practical significance it has when the
instrument given in payment is an unaccepted bill or an uncertified check,
and there is no one primarily and unconditionally liable on the instrument. But in those two cases, where recovery against the acceptor is impossible, especially when the underlying debt is independently secured
by collateral, the creditor's claim against the drawer or indorser has
more than academic interest ua
In the two cases thus far considered, the creditor always has a cause of
action on the instrument, despite his laches, against the party primarily
liable, whether or not that party is the debtor. The two following, deal
with the situation in which there is no primary obligor because the debtor
has drawn or indorsed an unaccepted bill or an uncertified check, and
delivered it to the creditor, who does not procure acceptance or certification. What rights, if any, may the negligent creditor claim on such instruments and on the debts underlying them?
Third Variation: In the third case, where the debtor is drawer of
an unaccepted bill or check, the rights of a creditor-holder guilty of laches
on the instrument are more troublesome. In England and in America,
the debtor-drawer is discharged on the instrument by the laces of the
creditor who has received a bill as payment. Failure to present for acceptance (where acceptance is required), or for payment, and failure to
give due notice of dishonor discharges the drawer from his obligation on
the bill both at common law,3 ,and under the Bills of Exchange Act and
the Negotiable Instruments Law." 7 This is said to be true even though
the holder is Prepared to show that the drawer suffered no injury from
the holder's laches. In the leading case of Dennis v. Morrice,10 evidence to show that the drawer was uninjured, was held inadmissible. But
in Dennis v. Morrice, Lord Kenyon was dealing with an accepted bill of
exchange, and to allow discharge of parties secondarily liable for laches
on that instrument is not unnecessarily harsh because, as we have seen,
the holder would still have his right of action against the acceptor. The
problem in the case of the unaccepted bill where the creditor's laches as
holder discharges his debtor as drawer, is the continuing liability of the
debtor on the underlying obligation. The question is typically presented
in Allen v. Eldred." The answer given there was that the creditor's
neglect of his remedies on the instrument would dischargethe debtor
on the underlying obligation as well as on the bill whether or not injury
resulted from the creditor's laches. The creditor was said to have made
34a. Recovery against the debtor on the underlying obligation presents the same
problems in these two situations as in the others.
35. CHIr=Y, Brs or Excam NE (1799) 86, 130; BYLES, BILLS (19th ed. 1931) 18, 266.
36. 3 Esp. 158 (N. P. 1800).
37. 50 Wis. 132, 6 N. W. 565 (1880).
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the instrument his own because of his own laches: that is, he had abandoned his right of conditional recourse to the underlying obligation, and,
therefore, the underlying obligation was considered paid. The answer of
the Wisconsin court is also that of the English courts,3s and the rule in
most American jurisdictions. 3 In a few states a more lenient rule applies: the debtor is to be discharged on the underlying obligation only if
he has been injured by the creditor's laches in prosecuting his rights on
the instrument, although in the absence of other facts the court will presume that such injury exists. 0 And in some jurisdictions there is
verbal support for the rule that the debtor will be discharged only to the
amount of his injury;4 but whenever any injury to the debtor is shown,
complete discharge on the debt seems to result.' The failure of the courts
to apportion the loss in these cases may be understood only in view of the
38. Darrach v. Savage, 1 Show K. B. 156 (1691); Chamberlyn v. Delarive, 2 Wils.
K. B. 353 (1767). Chitty speaks of a presumption of total damage to the drawer or
indorsers of a bill. Cmn=, BrT.s oF ExcH&,ZGE (1799) 130-131. Chalmers on the other
hand recognizes that the drawer of an unaccepted bill should not be discharged where he
is not damaged, despite the general rule. Ciua.ms, B=atS or Excmau0G (10th ed. 1932) 370.
39. Adams v. Boyd, 33 Ark. 33 (1878); Minehart v. Handlin, 37 Ark. 276 (1881);
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501 (1863); Adams v. Darby and Barksdale, 28 Mo.
162 (1859); Dayton v. Trull, 23 Wend. 345 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1840); Henry v. Donnaghy,
1 Addison 39 (Pa. County Ct. 1792); Mehlberg v. Tisher, 24 Wis. 607 (1869); Schierl
v. Baumel, 75 Wis. 69, 43 N. W. 724 (1889). Cf. International Trust Co. v. City of
Rexburg, 48 Idaho 279, 281 Pac. 472 (1929) ; Commercial Investment Trust Co. v. LundgrenWittenstein Co., 173 Minn. 33, 216 N. W. 531 (1927); Pohl v. Johnson, 179 Blinn. 393,
229 N. W. 555 (1930); Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171 (1870). With few exceptions, the
possibility that the holder's laches may have caused the drawer-debtor no actual monetary
damage is not even considered. In Henry v. Donnaghy, supra, the court refused to beed
an argument to that effect, and ruled that the holder, by giving further time, made a new
contract and discharged the drawer. And in Minehart v. Handlin, supra, the court di-

charged the drawer on the debt, saying "want of injury is no excuse for non-presentment,
or failure to give notice."
The courts do not seem to distinguish between accepted and unaccepted bills in laying
down rules as to the discharge of the drawer on the underlying obligation. Thus, the
same general rule discharging the drawer on an accepted bill (see cases cited note 33a sufpa)
is applied to the above cases involving unaccepted bills.
40. Dow v. Cowan, 23 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); McCrary v. Carrington,
35 Ala. 69S (1860) (burden on the plaintiff to show no injury); Stewart v. Millard, 7
Lans. 373 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1872) (damage presumed from want of notice); Smith v.
Miller, 52 N. Y. 545 (1873) (mere proof that the drawee was insolvent is not enough
to show that the laches caused no damage). See Gallagher v. Roberts, 9 Fed. Cas. No.
5195 (C. C. D. Pa. 1808); Welch v. Taylor Mfg. Co., 82 Ill. 579, 580 (1876). It may
be noted that the only cases found supporting an injury rule, are those above, which deal
with unaccepted bills.

41. See Hamilton v. Cunningham, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 5978 (E. D. Va. 1828); Commercial
Investment Trust Co. v. Lundgren-Witteastein Co., 173 inn. 83, 216 N. W. 531 (1927);
Shipman v. Cook, 16 N. J. Eq. 251 (Ch. 1863); cf. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Knox,
187 N. C. 565, 122 S. E. 304 (1924); 5 PAGr, CoTRaAcrs (2nd ed. 1920) § 2814.

42.

See cases cited notes 38, 39, supra.
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usual judicial reluctance to resolve difficult questions of damages.
Where, on the other hand, the creditor has received a check drawn by
his debtor in payment, and failed to make due presentment, the debtor
will not be automatically discharged either as drawer of the check or as
obligor on the underlying obligation, either in England or in this
country.4 3 It is difficult to see why the holder of a check should in this
respect be placed in a more advantageous position.44
This distinction between the treatment of bills and checks first appeared in the United States and not in England. Neither Chitty nor
Byles, writing before 1840, recognized any such distinctions. Chancellor
Kent and Mr. Justice Story, must take a major part of the responsibility
for this more generous treatment of creditors who have taken checks in
payment. In Conroy v. Warren Chancellor Kent seized upon an occasion to make law. The holder of a check had presented it for payment,
in what might be considered an unreasonably long time after date. The
drawer set up the holder's laches as discharging the instrument, but Kent
ruled that the drawer would have to show damages before he could avail
himself of this excuse. When writing his Commentaries in 1826, Kent had
the further opportunity to declare that the law was as he had made it.
He was satisfied to trace the "liberal" check rule no further back than to
Conroy v. Warren.4 6 It remained for Mr. Justice Story to establish the
43. BnL.s or EXCHANGE Acr, 45 & 46 VicT., c. 61, § 74 (1882): "Subject to the provisions of this Act-Cl) Where a cheque is not presented within a reasonable time of Its
issue, and the drawer or the person on whose account it is drawn had the right at the
time of such presentment as between him and the banker to have the cheque paid and
suffers actual damage through the delay, he is discharged to the extent of such damage,
that is to say, to the extent to which such drawer or person is a creditor of such banker
to a larger amount than he would have been had such cheque been paid. (2) In determining what is a reasonable time regard shall be had to the nature of the instrument, the
usage of trade and of bankers, and the facts of the particular case. (3) The holder of
such cheque as to which such drawer or person is discharged shall be a creditor, in lleu
of such drawer or person, of such banker to the extent of such discharge, and entitled to
recover the amount from him." N. I. L. § 186: "A check must be presented for payment
within a reasonable time after its issue, or the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay."
That the drawer is not automatically discharged on the underlying obligation: Campbell
v. Shark, 46 Idaho 278, 267 Pac. 458 (1928); Manitoba Mortgage and Investment Co.,
Ltd. v. Weiss, 18 S. E. 459, 101 N. W. 37 (1904); Mars, Inc. v. Chubrilo, 216 Wis. 313,
257 N. W. 157 (1934). Laches does not defeat or modify the right on the underlying
obligation where the check is given in payment of taxes. See County Board of Education
v. Slaughter, 16-0 So. 758 (Ala. 1935); Note (1926) 44 A. L. R. 1234. The situation is
undoubtedly indigenous, but indicates that the provisions of the N. 1. L. do not always
affect the underlying claim.
44. Edwards states the dfference as though it were only one of evidence, rather than
one of principle. Such reasoning may have allowed the difference to develop without
close scrutiny. EDWARDS, Birds or ExcMNGE AND PRoMIssoRY NOTES (1863) *396, *397.
45. 3 Johns. 259 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1802).
46. 3 KENr, COMhENTAUES (1826) 58.
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"check4 7 rule" as "law." In 1843, The Matter of Brown came before
Story.
The accommodation maker of a note had been forced to pay,
and he now turned to the accommodated payee for reimbursement. The
payee had drawn a check to secure his creditor, the accommodation
maker, and the check was subsequently dishonored. In the suit which followed, the debtor raised the defense that his creditor (the accommodation maker) had neither presented the check in due time nor given proper
notice of dishonor. Justice Story greeted this defense in the following
classic words: "A more inequitable defense against a just debt can
scarcely be imagined. It is precisely what a Court of Equity would feel
itself bound to redress by the fullest exercise of its powers . . . "s He
did not indicate any reason, perhaps he did not believe that any existed,
why this defense would be less inequitable in the case of a bill.
Meanwhile this check rule had made its appearance in England. Two
years before The Matter of Brown, Lord Abinger in Serle v. Norton,49
made the rather innocent remark that "It is reasonable to allow some little
space of time in the case of cheques on county bankers beyond what is
usual in the case of London bankers. If, indeed, any loss had been sustained by the defendant through the non-presentment at any earlier
period, that might have made a difference." One year later, Chief Justice
Tindal, in the case of Alexander v. Burchfield, enlarged upon the dictum.
"In the case of a cheque," he said, "the holder does not lose his remedy
against the drawer, by reason of non-presentment within any prescribed
time after taking it, unless the insolvency of the party on whom it is
drawn has taken place on the interval.... ."o It remained, however, for
Mr. Justice Patterson, in Robinson v. Hawksford, to establish the check
rule as controlling in England, by announcing, with considerable braggadocio (for the statement was not necessary to the case before him) that
he could not "see that there is anything unreasonable in keeping a
cheque for any time short of six years."5' After such a pronouncement,
it was only natural that subsequent editions of Chitty and Byles should
declare that a drawer would not be discharged on the check through the
laches of the creditor if there was no injury; and they did so as though it
had always been the law. 2
47. 4 Fed. Cas. No. 1,985, at 342 (C. C. Mass. 1843).
48. Id. at 524. For the further development of this check rule see Daniels v. Kyle,

1 Ga. 304 (1847); Morrison v. McCartney, 30 Mo. 183 (1860); Freeholders of Middluex
v. Thomas, 20 N. J. Eq. 39 (Ch. 1869) (basing the result on an implied contract assumed
by the holder); Kinyon v. Stanton, 44 Wis. 479 (1878).
50. 7 Mlan. & G. 1061 (C. P. 1842).
49. 2 M. & Rob. 402 (N. P. 1841).
51. 15 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.) 377 (1846). It was subsequently held that the claim on

the cheque against the drawer was barred by the sit year prescription period. Judge
Patterson's dictum was the basis of the decision in the later case of In re Bethell, 34 Ch. D.

561 (1887).
52.

CHrrr, Bins oF Exc31WGE (11th ed. 1878) 361; BYLrs, Bins (10th ed. 1870)
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Although we can trace the development of this distinction between
bills and checks, we can only conjecture as to the reason for it. It
should not be forgotten that there was some feeling that the drawer
of a check, like the maker of a note, is the primary debtor, not to
be discharged by the laches of the holder. 3 There is, of course, a
clear functional difference between bills and checks in that bills are
regarded, perhaps erroneously, merely as a means of liquidating a claim
against the drawee which has arisen through a prior business transaction,
while the check is used chiefly as a device to transfer deposit currency.
In most cases the bank honors checks only if the drawer has adequate
funds in its hands. This view of the check is reflected in the conviction
that a check, unlike a bill, was a definite appropriation of a fund in the
hapds of the bank to the benefit of the creditor. 4 If a fund had been definitely appropriated, even though only conceptually, it might have seemed
more unfair to bar the creditor from access to this fund because of his
laches. It is also possible that the check rule grew up as a result of the
use of banks as collecting agents for checks. This made the question of
determining what was a reasonable time for the presentment of checks
more difficult. Should, for instance, the banks in the provinces have more
time than those in the City of London? Would it be necessary to abandon the strict rule of one day's time and make a new rule based on the
particular custom of each locality? There is some evidence that in order
to avoid this difficulty a broader rule was made; there was to be no question as to the reasonable time for presentment of a check in all those
cases where the drawer had suffered no injury due to the laches of the
holder. It was hoped that the injury cases would be so few in number
that litigation to determine what constituted a reasonable time as applied to them would be scarce and therefore occasion no difficulty.6
19-20. For further development of the English rule see Laws v. Rand, 3 C. B. N, S. 441
(1857); Hopkins v. Ware, 20 L. T. R. (N. S.) 668 (Ex. 1869); "Heywood v. Pickering,
L. R. 9 Q. B. 428 (1874).
53. See Ramchurn Mullick v. Luchmeechund Radakissen, 9 Moo. P. C. 46, 70 (1854);
Morrison v. McCartney, 30 Mo. 183, 187 (1860). See also 4 KENT, COMMENTAIES (4th
ed. 1840) 549. The idea that the drawer of a check is a principal debtor persists, See
Jones v. Board of Education, 242 App. Div. 17, 272 N. Y. Supp. 5 (1934); FALCONn Io.,
BANXING A'ND BILrs oF EXCHANGE (5th ed. 1935) 774.

54. See Keene v. Beard, 8 C. B. N. S. 372, 379 (1860); King v. Porter [1925] N. I.
107, 119; Daniels v. Kyle, 1 Ga. 304 (1846). But see Hopkinson v. Forster, L. R. 19
Eq. 74 (1873).
It has been suggested that one reason why the drawer is not discharged in the absence
of injury is that "the drawer may protect himself by withdrawing them (the funds) or
withholding the further accumulation of effects in the drawee's hands." Commercial Bank
of Albany v. Hughes, 17 Wend. 94, 97 (N. Y. 1837). The argument, however, goes too
far since it denies the obligation not to withdraw which is often stated to exist, and it
would also put the risk of loss on the drawer.
55. See Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Camp. 537 (N. P. 1810); Alexander v. Burchfield, 7 Man.
& G. 1061, 1067 (Com. P1. 1842) (the court refused to extend the "reasonable time,"
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When injury to the debtor-drawer does result from the creditor's laches,
the debtor is totally discharged under the English common law rule, irrespective of the size of the injury."" In this country, for a time a similar
result obtained." The rationalization of the result probably was similar
to that suggested by some recent cases, that the creditor has "made the
check his own" under such circumstances.5 s This notion of the creditor
as a converter of the instrument, could easily have caused the rule affording total discharge to the injured debtor, to become firmly established in
this country. But the majority rule as it is today stated, and this may be
due in part to an over-enthusiastic interpretation of Kent by Story,"9
discharges the injured debtor-drawer only pro tanto on the instrument
and on the underlying obligation. Yet a study of the cases applying this
pro tanto rule will show that actual apportionment of the loss is rarely
made, 0° possibly for the reason that it generally is extremely difficult to
prove less than total loss. In any event it is almost correct to say, for
practical purposes, that total discharge follows any injury to the drawer
of a check.0 ' It may be, however, that out-of-court assignments of the
stating that the holder still had his remedy against the drawer despite delay in presentment,
unless the drawee's insolvency intervened). There was an early suggestion that what is a
reasonable time for the presentment of a check may differ radically from that of a bill,
despite the usual statement that checks have a shorter period for presentment. See
Rothschild v. Corry, 9 Barn. & Cress. 388 (K. B. 1829); SToRY, Pnoirissorn Nomas (2nd
ed. 1847) 64S.
56. See Laws v. Rand, 3 C. B. N. S. 442 <1857) and cases therein cited; King v.
Porter [19251 N. I. 107.
57. See 3 K=-r, Comu-,=ras (5th ed. 1844) 104-105.
58. Watt v. Gans, 114 Ala. 264, 21 So. 1011 (1896); Lowell Co-operative Bank v
Sheridan, 284 Mass. 594, 188 N. E. 636 (1934); Kilpatrick v. Home B. & L. Ass'n., 119
Pa. 30, 12 AUt. 754 (1888); Wessel v. Montgomery, 106 Pa. Super. 341, 163 Aft. 347 (1932);
Manitoba Mortgage and Investment Co., Ltd. v. Weiss, 18 S. D. 459, 101 N. W. 37 (1904).
See Kraetsch v. City of Chicago, 198 ]lL App. 395 (1916).
This assumption of risk would arise where the payee had notice that any delay in
presentment would be dangerous; if upon such notice he took the check he could not
be allowed even the usual time, if injury should result. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Keith,
97 Okla. 55, 221 Pac. 1003 (1923).
59. STORY, PRommsoRy Nomas (2nd ed. 1847) 655. Neither the note referred to in
KMT (supra note 57) nor the cases cited in SroRY can be said to he authority for a
pro tanto rule: if there was injury, the drawer was totally discharged.
60. See Ostrander v. Sauer, 208 Iowa 77, 224 N. W. 581 (1929); Graham v. Morstadt,
40 Mo. App. 333 (1890); Sulsberger & Sons Co. v. Cramer, 170 App. Div. 114, 155 N. Y.
S. 775 (1915); Mars, Inc. v. Chubrilo, 216 Wis. 313, 257 N. W. 157 (1934). The lower
court in Kling Bros. & Co. v. Whipps, 132 Okla. 253, 270 Pac. 79 (1928) apportioned the
loss. And the court wished to employ the pro tanto rule in Sugnet v. Board of Education,
241 App. Div. 883, 272 N. Y. Supp. 21 (2nd Dep't. 1934) and in Hawks v. Board of
Education, 241 App. Div. 880, 272 N. Y. Supp. 24 (2nd Dep't, 1934), but it was not
informed as to what the loss would be.
61. Daniels v. Kyle, 5 Ga. 245 (1848); Campbell v. Shark, 46 Idaho 278, 267 Pac. 458
(1928) (the creditor may not introduce evidence that a depositor of the same class as
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drawer's rights against the bank have somewhat protected the holder, 2
although there seems to be little reason why a drawer should make such
an assignment in those states where the holder has the burden of proving
63
the absence of injury.
Back of the court's failure to apportion the loss, and of the growth of
the common law rule, at least in England, that discharge on both the
instrument and the underlying obligation is total when any injury is
shown, may be something analogous to the traditional treatment of contributory negligence. It is undoubtedly harsh to bar a creditor who
has been guilty of contributory negligence from all relief against the
tort-feasor.6 4 Thus, in the case of a check, the creditor recovers if
it is shown that no loss has resulted from his laches; but if loss is
shown, he may not recover at all. The court again is attempting to
avoid what may be a difficult question of damages. In the case of a bill,
the drawer received a dividend when the drawee bank's insolvency was the injury of
which the drawer complains); Hamlin v. Simpson, 105 Iowa 125, 74 N. W. 906 (1898);
Northern Lumber Co. v. Clausen, 201 Iowa 701, 208 N. W. 72 (1926); Anderson v.
Rodgers, 53 Kan. 542, 36 Pac. 1067 (1894); Henderson Chevrolet Co. v. Ingle, 202 N. C.
158, 162 S. E. 219 (1932). See Gordon v. Levine, 194 Mass. 418, 80 N. E. 505 (1907).
Cf. Stark v. Public Nat. Bank, 123 Misc. 647, 649, 206 N. Y. Supp. 8, 11 (1924). See
(1930) 8 N. C. L. RFv. 444, 449.
62. See Gregg v. George, 16 Kan. 546 (1876).
63. In the application of the so-called pro tanto rule, considerable difference has arisen
as to the burden of proof. The majority rule seems to be that the drawer will have
the burden of showing that he has been injured. Empire-Arizona Copper Co. v. Shaw,
20 Ariz. 471, 181 Pac. 464 (1919); Newell Contracting Co. v. Lacy, 229 Ala. 208, 155
So. 379 (1934); McDaniel v. Mackey, 40 Ga. App. 517, 10 S. E. 439 (1929); Sims v.
Hunter, 44 Idaho 505, 258 Pac. 550 (1927); Cox v. Citizens State Bank, 73 Kan. 789,
85 Pac. 702 (1906); Spink, etc., Drug Co. v. Ryan Drug Co., 72 Minn. 178, 75 N. V.
18 (1898); Dehoust v. Lewis, 128 App. Div. 131, 112 N. Y. Supp. 559 (1908); Rosenbaum
v. Hazard, 233 Pa. 206, 82 AtL 62 (1911); Mars, Inc. v. Chubrilo, 216 Wis. 313, 257 N. W.
157 (1934). See Nuzum v. Sheppard, 87 W. Va. 243, 104 S. E. 587 (1920). That the
holder, however, has the burden of proving no injury: National Plumbing Co. v. Stevenson,
213 Ill. App. 49 (1918); Nelson v. Kastle, 105 Mo. App. 187, 79 S. W. 730 (1904); cf.
Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, 93 Tenn. 409, 24 S. W. 1130 (1894) (the burden of proof of
loss to an indorser, if there is laches, shifts to the holder, namely, to prove there was no
injury, but recognizes the majority rule in regard to a drawer, by dictum).
In some of the states applying the majority rule, the burden is satisfied if the drawer
shows that the drawee bank is insolvent, and it remains for the holder to show that there
is no causal relation between his laches and the damage caused by the insolvency. Watt
v. Gans, 114 Ala. 264, 21 So. 1011 (1896); Sanders v. Lifsey, 41 Ga. App. 395, 153 S. E.
104 (1930); Hamlin v. Simpson, 105 Iowa 125, 74 N. W. 906 (1898); Martin Lumber Co.
v. Rice, 136 Okla. 172, 276 Pac. 733 (1929); see Spink, etc., Drug Co. v. Ryan Drug Co.,
72 Minn. 178, 180, 75 N. W. 18, 19 (1898). It has been held, however, that the drawer
will have this burden only if the holder sues on the original claim. Bradford v. Fox,
38 N. Y. 289 (1868). But see Hamlin v. Simpson, supmv, where it seems that the holder
will have the burden whether the suit is on the instrument or on the underlying obligation.
64.

See GREGORY, LEGISLATv

Loss DisTuTioN nq Nwssovm=cs

AcTioNs

Bohlen, Book Review (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1528.
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because of an anomalous presumption that the creditor's negligence
causes total damage in every case, he may not recover from the debtor
even though no damage has in fact been suffered. If, however, presentment and notice of dishonor are excused, the creditor is not guilty of
laches on a bill, or on a check if injury is shown (although this may be
modified by a pro tanto rule).c5 But a declaration by the acceptor that he
will not pay, or the bankruptcy of the acceptor, will not excuse the necessity for presentment."0 If the drawer had no effects in the drawee's
hands, however, and no reasonable expectation that the drawee would pay,
both presentment and notice of dishonor are excused. GT Such a holding
seems almost equivalent to a conclusive presumption that the drawer
had not been injured by the holder's "laches" in failing to present. Indeed, Lord Kenyon, in Dennis v. Morrice,0 alluded to the fact that if
the drawee held no funds of the drawer, notice was dispensed with, but,
he said, to allow proof that the drawer had suffered no injury in every
case "would be extending the rule still further than ever has been done,
and opening new sources of litigation in investigating whether in fact the
drawer did receive prejudice for the want of notice or not." That the
basis for excusing presentment and notice is in effect a presumption of
65. Where the drawer had no funds in the bank at the time of drawing or subsequently
withdrew them, presentment is not required. Carson & Co. v. Fincher, 133 Mich. 6656, 101
N. W. 844 (1904); First National Bank v. Linn County National Bank, 30 Ore. 296,
47 Pac. 614 (197); see Westphal v. Ludlow, 6 Fed. 348 (C. C. D. Minn. IS91); Briggs
v. Parson, 39 Mlich. 400, 405 (1878); Jones v. Heiliger, 36 Wis. 149 (1874); cf. Whitten
v. Wright, 34 Mich. 92 (1872); American Nat. Bank v. Bank of Bandon, 240 Fed. 624
(C. C. A. 9th, 1917). Similarly, where there is a partial deficiency of deposit, presentment
is excused. Grant v. MacNutt, 12 Misc. 20, 33 N. Y. Supp. 62 (Com. P1. 1895). But
in either case, there must be a demand to hold an indorser. Mohawk Bank v. Broderick,
10 Wend. 304 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1839). No notice of dishonor is required where the drawer
had no funds with the drawee, at least on general demurrer. Kemble v. Mills, 1 Man.
& G. 75 (C. P. 1840). Where presentment or notice of dishonor is thus excused, and the
bill or check was taken in payment for a chattel, the creditor if the check remains unpaid
may rescind the transaction and recover the chattel from the buyer and those who stand
in no better position than he. South San Francisco Packing Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal
131, 190 Pac. 628 (1920) ; Peoples State Bank v. Brown, 80 Kan. 520, 103 Pac. 102 (1909) ;
Globe AMing Co. v. Minneapolis Elevator Co., 44 Minn. 153, 46 N. W. 306 (1890);
Ballard v. First National Bank, 195 S. W. 559 (Mo. App. 1917); Mott v. Nelson, 96 Okla.
SALES (2nd ed. 1924) § 346a. Where there is
117, 220 Pac. 617 (1923). See Wh -Lsmr,
a stop payment order, presentment is not reqfzired to hold the drawer. Sebree v. Thomas,
166 Ill. App. 427 (1911); Patterson v. Oakes, 191 Iowa 78, 181 N. W. 787 (1926); Usher
v. Tucker, 217 Mlass. 441, 105 N. W. 360 (1914); Worden v. Frazee, 6 Jones & Spen. 10
(N. Y. Super. Ct. 1874). But see Brown v. Cow Creek Sheep Co., 121 Wyo. 1, 126 Pac.
886 (1912). And in England, proof that the drawer has countermanded payment does
not excuse presentment. Hill v. Heap, Dowl. & Ry. N. P. 57 (1822).
66. Baker v. Birch, 3 Camp. 107 (N. P. 1811); Esdaile v. Sowerby, 11 East. 114, 117
(K. B. 1809); Purcell v. Allemong, 22 Grat. 739 (Va. 1872).
67. Terry v. Parker, 6 Ad. & E. 802 (K. B. 1837); N. I. L. §§ 79, 114 (4); Bmts or
ExcH,-,co AcT, §§ 46 (2) (c), 80 (2) (c). And see cases cited note 65 supra.
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no damage, is further indicated by Cory v. Scott. 8 Here the creditor
had failed to give notice of dishonor. The drawer had no effects with the
drawee, but the bill had been drawn for the accommodation of an
indorsee. It was pointed out that if the drawer received no notice of
dishonor, his right against the accommodated indorsee might be impaired.
The drawer was therefore totally discharged, although normally notice
would have been excused. The mechanism of these presumptions provides the courts with a device for shifting loss, analogous to the last clear
chance doctrine, and similarly inadequate as a means of apportioning
loss.
The British Bills of Exchange Act contains a more successful device
for apportioning loss resulting from the laches of a creditor who holds
a check drawn by his debtor. The holder's rights against the drawer
remain intact unless the drawer has suffered injury. Where there is
injury, however, it is presumed to be to the full amount of the check,
but the holder gains an assignment of the drawer's right to that amount
against the bank 3 The result is equitable where the injury is the insolvency of the drawee bank, but it is possible that the injury to the
drawer may be caused by something other than the drawee's insolvency.
And in such a case, the problem will arise whether the statute is applicable. It is at least arguable that the only type of injury for which the
holder must account, is the drawee's insolvency, because all other
injuries are too remote. 9 But the English courts prior to the Bills of
Exchange Act indicated, in two cases dealing with analogous problems,
that other types of injury may not be too remote. In Hopkins v. Warc,70
the debtor was discharged when the creditor failed to present a check
drawn by the debtor's attorney in due time, and the attorney absconded
during the period of laches. In Cory v. Scott,0 one ground for holding
that a creditor must give notice of dishonor of a bill of exchange despite
the absence of effects in the drawee's hands, was the possibility that by
the delay the drawer might lose his right of reimbursement against an
accommodated indorsee. Assuming that the injury is not too remote, it
may be held that the Act covers only cases in which the drawee becomes
insolvent. If the Act is so interpreted, will the debtor then be totally
discharged as he was at common law in England? Or, will it be held
that the "spirit" of the provision 'establishes a pro tanto rule for all
injury cases?
In this country the Negotiable Instruments Law codifies the pro tanto
rule.7' In most cases, however, courts have either allowed total dis68.

3 Barn. & Ald. 619 (K. B. 1828).

69.

See King v. Porter [1925] N. I. 107, and Comment (1925)

160 L. T. 67.

70. 20 L. T. R. (N. S.) 668 (Ex. 1869)
71. N. I. L. § 186.
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charge or total recovery. The amount to be received from an insolvent
bank is in most cases difficult to estimate, and although it theoretically
is possible to keep the judgment open pending final liquidation7 2 the
courts have not often done so. But, notwithstanding the codification of
the pro tanto rule, some courts continue to hold that total discharge
results wherever there has been any injury to the drawer.7 3 The theory
offered in justification, especially by Chief Justice Rugg of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, is that by his conduct the creditor has
made the check his own. His views may be justified when the check has
been certified, for the holdei would still have a right of action against
the bank despite his laches. Such was the case in Seager v. Daupinee.7

But in Lowell Co-Operative Bank v. Sheridan,73 where there appears to
have been no certification, Chief Justice Rugg gave the defendant his
complete discharge, stating that "the plaintiff made the check its own,
not having presented it for payment within the time permitted by law."
The decision is all the more interesting in that it quotes the pro tanto
statutory provision as a prelude to granting total discharge.
Even under the pro tanto rule of the statute it is still, of course,
necessary to determine whether the injury of which the debtor complains
was in fact caused by the holder's laches. 70 The rule has often been
stated, though some authority to the contrary may be found, as if the
only injury of which the holder must take account, is the drawee's insolvency.1 7 Thus in Andrus v. Bradley,78 the drawer of a check made
72. See (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 444, 449.
73. Lowell Co-operative Bank v. Sheridan; Wessel v. Montgomery; Manitoba Mortgage
and Investment Co., Ltd., v. Weiss, all supra note 58.
74. 284 Mass. 96, 187 N. E. 94 (1933). See Steffen and Starr, A Blue Print for the
Certified Check (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 450, 471, commenting on this case.
75. 284 Mass. 594, 188 N. E. 636 (1934).
76. Of course, in certain cases the delay apparently has no causal relation to the injury,
as where the check was incorrectly signed by the drawer and would not have been honored
anyway. School District v. Eager, 19 Okla. 235, 91 Pac. 847 (1907). Or where the
drawer's error itself caused the delay, such as the situation in which the check was drawn
on a bank which no longer existed. Joerns Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Burns, 173 Minn. 389,
217 N. W. 506 (1928). See Bradbury Fertilizer Co. v. Lathrop, 2 N. Y. City Ct. Rep.
289 (1886).
77. Andrus v. Bradley, 102 Fed. 54 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1900); Heralds of Liberty v.
Hurd, 44 Pa. Super. 478 (1910). See Morrison v. McCartney, 30 Mo. 183 (8 UO). But
see Oldridge v. Sutton, 157 Mo. App. 489, 137 S. W. 994 (1911). In a number of cases
in which the drawer was discharged on the underlying debt because of the holder's lacbes,
the only damage apparent was in the settlement of accounts with the drawee. Adams v.
Boyd, 33 Ark. 33 (1878); Star v. Kerr, 31 Miss. 199 (1856); Schierl v. Baumel, 75 Wis.
69, 43 N. W. 724 (1889).
The writer of the Note in (1912) 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 255, argues that any kind of
injury proximately caused by the delay is sufficient. But Moskowitz v. Deutsch, 46 Misc.
603, 92 N. Y. Supp. 721 (Sup. Ct. 1905) may be construed as contra. It is suggested that
under § 186 of the N. I. L., as amended in the Illinois Act (fnfra note 83), there may
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a settlement of his accounts with the payee on the basis that the check
was still in the payee's possession and would not be presented. But
the payee had passed the check onto the holder who had failed to present
the check within a reasonable time. It is fair to assume that if due
presentment had taken place the drawer would not have been defrauded.
Nevertheless, the court held the drawer liable on the ground that only
the insolvency of the drawee will discharge the drawer where the holder
has been guilty of laches. In Heralds of Liberty v. Hurd,70 the court
refused to allow the drawer to set up as injury, the settlement of a
partnership account in the belief that the check had been paid. The
check was still outstanding because the holder had failed to present it
for payment. On the other hand, the New York court, in an action
based on breach of a contract to establish a line of credit, held that the
insolvency of the agent of the drawer (with whom the drawer had
deposited funds) during the period of the holder's laches, would be
sufficient to discharge the drawer.8 0
Neither the Bills of Exchange Act nor the Negotiable Instruments Law
defines the effect of a holder's failure to give notice of dishonor on the
liability of the drawer of a check. Ames suggested that the result of
the omission would be the drawer's total discharge; 81 Brannan concluded
that under the Act the drawer was discharged. 2 In practice, however,
the "pro tanto" injury rule seems to have been applied in this country."8
be no requirement either to present or give notice save where the loss is caused by the
failure of the drawee bank. Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928)
38 YALE L. J. 25, 54.
78. 102 Fed. 54 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1900).
79. 44 Pa. Super. 478 (1910).
80. Ferrari v. First National Bank of Confiellsville, Pa., 246 N. Y. 382, 159 N. E. 178
(1927). See Note (1926) 40 HARv. L. REV. 128, commenting on the lower court's decision
which was here reversed.
It should be noted that where the check used in P'payment" has been drawn for the
accommodation of the debtor, the courts are less inclined to hold the drawer discharged
because of the creditor's laches. See Stewart v. Smith, 17 Ohio St. 82, 86 (1866); Deener
v. Brown, 1 McArthur 350 (D. C. (1874). But cf. Griffin v. Riblet, 6 N. Y. Leg. Obs.
421 (1848). See also Note (1902) 53 L. R. A. 433.
81. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1900) 14 HAnv. L. REV. 241, 256; Ames,
The Negotiable Instruments Law-Necessary Amendments (1903) 16 HuRv. L. RV. 255, 261.
82. Brannan, Some Necessary Amendments of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1913)
26 HARv. L. Rxv. 588, 599-600. He suggests an amendment to § 186 to include failure
to give due notice of dishonor. An amendment of similar nature is proposed in HArNeooK
or T=E NATIONAL CONFRENCE oF COMMISSIONxRs ON UNuOR.

STATE LAWS

AND

PAO-

(1933) 204.
83. Deal v. Atlantic Coast Line Rr., 225 Ala. 533, 144 So. 81 (1932); Williams v.
Braun, 14 Cal. App. 396, 112 Pac. 465 (1910); Industrial Bank of Chicago v. Bowes,
165 Ill.
70, 46 N. E. 10 (1897); Cellars v. Dwinnell, 87 Mont. 73, 285 Pac. 181 (1930);
Morris-Miller Co. v. Von Pressentin, 63 Wash. 74, 114 Pac. 912 (1911). See Gregg v.
George, 16 Kan. 546 (1876); Lowell Co-operative Bank v. Sheridan, 284 Mass. 594, 188
CEEDINGS
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No difficulty has been occasioned as yet upon the point in England.s4

Under German law, the debtor-drawer of a bill or a check is discharged
on the instrument by the creditor's failure to make due presentment, or by

his failure to obtain a proper protest when the drawee refuses to pay;
but incongruously, failure to give due notice of dishonor does not discharge
the debtor on the instrument, although the creditor is liable in damagesY8

In order to preserve his right on the underlying obligation, the creditor
is usually under a duty to present the instrument for payment, and,

if it is dishonored, td notify his debtor so that the latter can safeguard
his rights against the drawee."" Since the debtor is the drawer, however,
the creditor need not obtain a protest since such action is only necessary
in order to preserve rights of recourse against prior parties, and the
drawer, of course, never has any right of recourse on the instrument
to preserve

But the creditor may nevertheless recover in toto on the

underlying obligation notwithstanding his failure to make due presentment or to give notice of dishonor, unless he or his agent, for instance
the collecting bank, has been negligent in the performance of his duties,-s
and such negligence has injured the debtor.80 No damages, however,
N. E. 636 (1934); Jones v. Board of Education, 242 App. Div. 17, 29, 272 N. Y. Supp.
5, 19 (1934); (1933) 46 HsAv. L. REV. 845. But see Bacigalupo v. Parilli, 112 N. Y.
Supp. 1040 (App. Div. 1908). Contra: Ewald v. Faulhaber Stable Co., 55 Misc. 275, 105
N. Y. Supp. 114 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Kuflick v. Glasser, 114 N. Y. Supp. 870 (App. Div. 1909).
A few states have amended § 186 to include the case of notice of dishonor. Ir. PE,. STrT.
(Cahill 1935) c. 98, § 207; S. D. Comp. LAw (1929) § 1888; W. VA. CODE (Aichie 1932)
§ 4497.
Generally, however, the drawer will not be entitled to notice of dishonor, for in most
instances the reason for dishonor is either insufficient funds or a stop payment order. See
N. I. L. § 114. Falconbridge says "it is anomalous that the drawer of a cheque should
ever be entitled to notice of dishonour, he being the principal debtor on the instrument
and having recourse against no one," but concludes that he is under § 96 of the Canadian
Bills of Exchange Act and therefore entitled to notice. FAcoaRmrE, BA,=;c m Bmrs
oF ExcHASuGE (5th ed. 1935) 774.
84. In Heywood v. Pickering, L. R. 9 Q. B. 428 (1874) the court expre ly refued
to deal with this point. But see In re British and American Steam Navigation Co., L. R.
8 Eq. 506 (1869).
85. Gnzmasir WEcnsnoEsrz (1933) Art. 43, 44, 53, 45; Gaasr.I. ; SCCiWEsETZ Art.
40-42 (1934).

86. SrTAu-STmz, op. cit. supra note 2, at Art. 89 Anm. 26a. The creditor is, however, under no duty to sue prior parties, but may sue the debtor immediately. Reichgericht,
October 10, 1896 (1896) 26 Juasrrscn Wocmn sciaarr 640.
87. Gmzm" WEcB5ELGsE-rz (1933) Art. 53.
88. LANoEr, Zur ScnHEC-REcHT (1910) 31 n. 119; 1 BR=IT, op. cit. supra note 3, at
3of; STAmu-STR~z, op. cit. supra note 2, at Art. 89 Anm. 26a; contra: MuEr.ER-EnMzcrr,

op. cit. spra note 2, at 508. The requirement of diligence results from the theory that
the creditor who is guilty of laches breaches a contract implied in fact. Such a breach
r.rcnEs GrsL'r'aucH § 276). MEL.mpresupposes that the creditor was in fault (BUxE
ERzBAcH ibid.
89. 2 GRum:uT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 308; but see Reichsgericht, January 4, 1899,
10 SAEmsrscnEs Aacniv 239.

HeinOnline -- 45 Yale L. J. 1393 1935-1936

YALE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

are said to result if the drawer had no funds with the drawee at maturity
or if the drawee was already insolvent at maturity or if the drawee is
still solvent. 90 But if the drawee has become insolvent after the maturity
of the instrument and would have paid had it been duly presented, the
debtor has been damaged and the creditor will be liable to that amount.
In effect, therefore, the debtor who has been injured by the creditor's
negligence is discharged pro tanto on the underlying obligation. But,
where such discharge is allowed, it is not apparent whether the creditor
will be given an assignment of the debtor's right to dividends from the
insolvent drawee; or whether the court will merely estimate the amount
of these dividends and allow the creditor to recover from the debtor the
full claim less the amount of damage.
Under French law, if the debtor has paid by drawing a bill or check,
and the creditor-payee has not exercised due diligence, the latter nevertheless has a cause of action against the drawer on the instrument, if
there were no funds with the drawee at maturity. This situation arises
from the fact that since the Ordonnance de Commerce of 1673,9 1 the
liability of the drawer of a bill, in contrast to that of an indorser, "
subsists despite the holder's laches, unless he proves that at the time
of maturity he had on deposit with the drawee funds sufficient to meet
the instrument. 3 If he does not come within this exception,.he is still
liable, because he would otherwise be unjustly enriched at the holder's
4
expense0
Moreover, if the debtor-drawer did have an enforceable claim against
the drawee, the holder has a right of action directly against the drawee,
even though the latter has not accepted. This is effected through the
application of the provision doctrineY Provision is the claim which a
drawer has or is supposed to have against the drawee, at the maturity
of the instrument if it is a bill of exchange,"0 or if the instrument is a
90. 2 GRUENHUT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 308 n. 30.
91. Titre 5 art. 16; 1 GauEmrwT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 199.
92. CODE DE Cosm cz art. 156 (5); 4 LYON-CAEN E' REwAULT, op. cit. supra note 28,
at § 413.
93. Con DE Coiaa:F aft. 156 (6).
94. 2 LACOUR aT BOUTERON, op. cit. supra note 30, at § 1368. WIELAND, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 45.
95. LYON-CAEN Er RENAuLT, op. cit. supra note 28, at §§ 159 et seq.; Hwscu, Dn
FRANZOE ScEM WEcHSELPROVIS ONSLEHRE (1930); Wahl, Die Franzoesisce Wechsclprovl.
sionslehre, (1930)

4 ZErrscamT FuER AUSLAENDISCHES U~n INTEMWATIONALES PIUVATRECIT

405.

96. CODE DE Comdmmcr art. 116. However, the drawer, although he has negotiated the
instrument, may nevertheless withdraw the funds. WAJL, supra note 95 at 408. But the
holder can destroy this power of withdrawal by informing the drawee of the drawing
and negotiation of the bill of exchange and forbidding him to pay his debtor, the drawer.
4 LYON-CAEN Er RENAuLT, op. cit. supra note 28 at § 178 bis. At maturity, the mere
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check at the time of its issuanceP 7 This claim, the presence of which
justifies the drawing of the instrument, may arise out of any transaction,
for instance a sale, a factor's contract, or a line of credit. s The
peculiarity of the doctrine lies in the rule that the provision travels
with the instrument.9 Therefore, the holder has a direct cause of action
against the drawee based upon the drawer's claim against the drawee.lC'
The application of the rule is of particular importance where the drawer
has become insolvent, for in such a case the provision belongs to the
holder and not to the drawer's receiver.' 0 '
Intermediate between the situation where the debtor gives his own
note or accepts a bill, and where the debtor draws a bill or check, is
the case in which the debtor makes a note or accepts a bill payable
at a certain place. When the drawer or acceptor has on deposit a fund
at the place of payment, this domiciled instrument in some respects
resembles a check. And in England and America, the check rule, if
applied, would, of course, discharge the debtor when the creditor was
guilty of laches, at least to the extent to which any part of this fund was
lost through the insolvency of the agent. The majority rule, however,
holds the debtor liable, even though the creditor has been negligent and
the debtor injured through the failure of the bank in which the funds
to meet the instrument were deposited. 0 - The anomaly of this result
may be demonstrated by the fact that, if the holder forwarded the note
presentment of the instrument is apparently sufficient to hinder a payment to the drawer

which would discharge the drawee. Cour de Cassation, July 2, 1383, D.=oz JunsPRUDEN CE (1884) 1.272.
97. D~cret unifiant le droit en matire de ceques
Bou -Ro,, op. cit. supra note 34 at 224 et seq.

(30 octobre 1935) art. 3(3); 1

9S. W~aL, supra note 95 at 406. However, the drawer who is sued on the instrument
by the creditor cannot escape liability by pleading that the drawee was bound to honor

the instrument because of a line of credit agreement. He must show that he had actual funds
with the drawee.

4 LYox-CAEN ET RrNAuLT, op. cit. supra note 28 at §§ 106, 406, 409;

2 LAcOUR Er BouTRoN, op. cit. supra note 30 at § 1238.
99. CoDE ia COmCE, art. 116 (3).
100. It would be erroneous to believe that this theory makes an acceptance superfluous.

If the drawee has accepted, a bona fide indorsee is protected against all personal defenses
which the drawee might have against the drawer. If the holder has to sue on the provion

those defenses are available because he is in effect only an assgnee. WAnm, supra note
95, at 409.
101. Since the creditor-holder who is guilty of laches could apparently demand to be
subrogated to the drawer's claim against the drawee, the provision theory is of real
practical importance only where the drawer is bankrupt. It further prohibits the creditors
of the drawer from garnishing the drawer's claim against the drawee after the negotiation
of the instrument. WABrL. PRrmcs D DRorr Coiannr. (1922) § 1947.
102. Mloore v. Altom, 196 Ala. 158, 71 So. 681 (1916); Federal Intermediate Credit
Bank v. Epstin, 151 S. C. 67, 148, S. E. 713 (1929); Binghamton Pharmacy v. First
National Bank, 131 Tenn. 711, 176 S. W. 1038 (1915); BYLES, op. cit. supra note 4 (19th ed.
1931) 211, 219.
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or accepted bill for collection to the bank of payment, and delay had
occurred on the part of the bank and it subsequently became insolvent,
the maker or accepter would be discharged. 10 3 In Germany, under a
provision of the former German Wechselordnung in effect until 1908,104
the holder of a domiciled acceptance had to make presentment, and, if
he received no payment, to obtain a protest in order to preserve his
rights against the acceptor. The latter was in this respect treated like
a drawer. And a much cited decision of the German Reichsgericht
held that the creditor's laches would not discharge the debtor on the
underlying obligation if he was not damaged.105 If injury to the debtor
did result from the insolvency of the bank, the acceptor would be discharged pro tanto on the underlying obligation. But under the German
Wechselordnung since 1908, and under the present German Wechselgesetz (statute governing bills of exchange and promissory notes), the
holder of a domiciled acceptance need no longer present it at maturity
in order to preserve his rights on the instrument. However, when the
creditor fails to make due presentment it is very doubtful whether the
acceptor must now bear the risk of the insolvency of the payor-bank
after maturity. It may be argued' that the creditor by taking the
domiciled acceptance assumes the duty to collect on the instrument at
maturity, and if he fails to perform this duty, he is liable in damages.
Thus the creditor's claim on the instrument against the acceptor would
be subject to the debtor's counterclaim for damages.1 0 7
Fourth Variation: The fourth situation presents a debtor who has
indorsed a bill or uncertified check to his creditor. In both England
and this country the indorser is generally discharged on the instrument
and on the underlying obligation, if the creditor has been guilty of
laches.108 In a few states, it has been suggested that the indorser will
103. Scott County Milling Co. v. Weems, 179 Ark. 935, 19 S. W. (2d) 1027 (1929);
Baldwin's Bank of Penn Yan v. Smith, 215 N. Y. 76, 109 N. E. 138 (1915).
104. Wechselordnung Art. 43.
105. Reichsgericht, February 20, 1891, 27 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in ZIvilsachen 88.
106. I. VON STAUDINGERS, KOMMENTAR ZUM BUEGERLiCHEr GESETzDUCu UND DE
EINFUHUNGSGESETZ (9th ed. 1930) 678.
107. No mention is apparently made by the French courts or textwriters as to the
domiciled note or acceptance.
108. On the instrument: Bias OF EXCHANGR Acr, 45 & 46 Vxcr., c. 61 (1882), §9 40,
42, 45, 48, 86, 87 (2) (3); N. I. L. §§ 70, 89, 144; First National Bank v. Mackey,
157 Ill. App. 408 (1910); Miller v. Moseley, 26 La. Ann. 667 (1874); Veazl Bank v.
Winn., 40 Me. 60 (1855); Parker v. Reddick, 65 Miss. 242, 3 So. 575 (1888); Moody v.
Mack, 43 Mo. 210 (1869); First National Bank v. Miller, 37 Neb. 500, 55 N. W. 1061
(1893), 43 Neb. 791, 62 N. W. 195 (1895); Start v. Tupper, 81 Vt. 19, 69 Atl. 151 (1908);
Gifford v. Hardell, 88 Wis. 538, 60 N. W. 1064 (1894).

On the underlying obligation: Denniston v. Imbrie, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3802 (C, C. D).
Pa. 1818); Brown v. Schintz, 202 Il. 509, 6"7 N. E. 172 (1903); Wood Bros. Corp. v,
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be treated in the same manner as a drawer and that he will be disDischarge on the instrument is granted both
charged only if injured.'
at common law and under the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Bills
of Exchange Act, for the reason that the holder's laches has deprived
the indorser of his right of recourse on the instrument."10 The discharge
on the underlying obligation follows because if the indorser is held liable,
his opportunity for reimbursement against a prior party would be limited
to cases in which he had an enforceable claim against the prior party
other than the one on the instrument, which has been lost because of
the creditor's laches. In addition, it would involve difficult questions
of damage if the prior party's solvency were in doubt.
In Germany, when the debtor is the indorser of the unaccepted bill
or check used in "payment," the creditor is under an obligation to make
due presentment, give due notice of dishonor, and in addition to obtain
a proper protest if the instrument is dishonored, in order to preserve
rights on the instrument."' Otherwise, he not only deprives himself of
rights on the instrument, but his debtor-indorser loses any right of
recourse against prior parties. However, German courts and textwriters
agree that, despite his laches, the creditor has some remedy, although
they disagree as to its form.
A majority of the textwriters maintain that the creditor who is guilty
of laches may bring action against the debtor-indorser on the underlying
obligation, subject, however, to the debtor's right to set-off any damages
suffered.'- 2 But they base their argument in support of this thesis upon
a hypothetical case in which no damages have been caused, that is,
where all prior parties are solvent and have subsisting underlying obligations on which to fall back. But if any of the prior parties is insolvent,
or, if an underlying obligation does not subsist between any prior parties
except for the right of an accommodation party to reimbursement, difficult
questions as to causation and ascertainment of damage arise, which
writers of this persuasion overlook.'"
Aware that these problems cannot be solved under the majority
Francke, 122 Neb. 672, 241 1. W. 88 (1932); Jones v. Savage, 6 Wend. 658 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1831); Betterton v. Roope, 71 Tenn. 215 (1876).
109. Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N. Y. 19, 27 N. E. 763 (1891); American National Bank
v. National Fertilizer Co., 125 Tenn. 328, 143 S. W. 597 (1911). See State Bank v. Carroll,
81 Neb. 484, 116 N. W 276 (1908); Flieg v. Sleet, 43 Ohio St. 53, 56, 1 N. E. 24, 26
(1885) ; Jones v. Board of Education, 242 App. Div. 17, 29, 272 N. Y. Supp. 5, 19 (1934);
d. Small v. Franklin Mining Co., 99 Mass. 277 (1868).
110. See provisions of the BuLls or ECnAxca Acr and the NrcoT=L Iz;srnun-s
LAW, supra note 108; BYLzs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 266.
111. GERI-A-F WEoCHsE .LE5Z Art. 43, 44, 53; Scheckgesetz Art. 40-42.
112. STAuB-SmM~z, op. dt. supra note 2, at Art. 89 Anm. 26a.
113. Ditscher, Die Rechtliche Natur der Wechselbereicherungshlagc(1909) 65 ZE S aiUT
FUER HANDELspxcH 352, 357.
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theory, a minority of the writers on the other hand say that even in the
absence of damage, the creditor thus guilty of laches may in no case
114 Instead, they
sue a debtor-indorser on the underlying obligation.
would allow the creditor a right of action against the drawer (not the
debtor-indorser) if the drawer would be unjustly enriched by a discharge
from liability on the instrument."' This unjust enrichment action, based
on the instrument, is subsidiary in character, and allowed only if the
creditor has no other means of satisfying his claim."'
It is impossible to state definitely which view is supported by the
German courts. In two famous decisions, the former Reichs-Oberhandelsgericht took the minority view,11 7 but the higher German courts
have, in two recent cases, apparently adopted the damage theory, and
allowed the negligent creditor to recover from the debtor-indorser on
the underlying obligation. In one of the recent cases, the indorser had
not been damaged by failure to make due presentment because the drawee
(who had accepted the instrument) was insolvent at the maturity of the
instrument. 1 8 In the second case, the creditor sued his debtor-indorser
(who was this time not the drawer) on the original claim because the
check had been dishonored by the drawee when presented, two months
after its receipt by the creditor. The Oberlandesgericht of Hamburg
held that the creditor could not recover on the underlying obligation, but
the decision was apparently based on the assumption that the damages
caused the debtor equaled the amount of the underlying claim, and on the
ground that the debtor here would in fact have had no underlying obligation in turn to fall back upon, since the instrument had been purchased
from the drawer. The court left the plaintiff to seek his recovery from
19
the drawer upon the unjust enrichment action. 1 It may accordingly be
114. LArOr.G,op. cit. supral note 88, at 33.
115. WECHSELcESETz Art. 89; SCHECKGESFTZ Art. 58.
116. Reichsgericht, September 26, 1899, 44 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 78; MUELLER-ERZBACH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 510.
Therefore under the majority rule, the creditor cannot immediately sue the drawer for
unjust enrichment. Reichsgericht, May 4, 1918, 93 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerlchts in
Zivflsachen, 23; ,VAnL, suPra note 95 at' 410; LANGEc, ,DIE NVECISELVERDIDDLICURMT
(1934) 181.
Unlike the French law, however, a direct cause of action against the drawee who has
not accepted the bill but is still in possession of the funds has always been denied the

creditor on the theory that the drawing of a bill or check is not of itself an assignment
of the drawer's claim against the drawee. KassLER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 65, 66; SrAUS.
STRAmz, op. cit. supra note 2, at art. 14 Anmerkung 6.
DES Rrmcnsoyrn117. Reichsoberhandelsgericht, May 11, 1875, 17 ENTSCHEmUNoCE
EANDELsG.IC:HTS 269; Reichsoberhandelsgericht, January 28, 1876, 19 ENSCEMIuooSN Drg
170. Both decisions are influenced by Chitty and § 7 of
REcsoEMULDES EIcH5
the Statute of Anne. See further Reichsgericht January 4, 1899, 10 SAn-nsiscnu Aacmnv 239,
118. Oberlandesgericht Dresden, February 29, 1916, 72 SwrpsmTs Aicwmv 333,
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argued that these decisions indicate nothing more than a tendency to
allow the creditor to sue the debtor-indorser on the underlying obligation
provided the indorser in turn has an underlying obligation on which he
o
can recover.=In France, if the debtor has indorsed a draft or check in payment
and the creditor is guilty of laches, the debtor is discharged on the
instrument and probably on the underlying obligation. The creditor has
the same election of remedies, one against the drawer for unjust enrichment in certain cases and the other against the drawee, if a provision
may be found. In any event, whether the creditor is payee or indorsee,
he is amply protected and has no need to resort to his underlying claim.
Fifth Variation: The fifth typical payment problem appears in cases
when the debtor does not negotiate the instrument to his creditor by
indorsement but merely delivers a third party's instrument to the
creditor. In England and America, the result is somewhat anomalous.12 '
It is held in such cases that since the debtor is not a party to the
instrument, he may not require of his creditor the strict diligence
necessary in order to perfect a holder's right against an indorser or
drawer' 22 But discharge follows (whether or not pro tanto is in doubt)
119. Oberlandesgericht Hamburg: April 4, 1924, 45 RECniTSPRECUMJ
DEn OML'DScGEcIC
83. This is one of the rare cases in which payment was made by indorsing a
check on a New York bank. The main purpose of the transaction which was made
during the darkest period of the German inflation was to give the indorsee access to a
stable currency. Lyon, Folgen VerspaeteterScheckvorlegung (1925) 3 Htzsr a-r sLc RIrxis.
zmsrr
154. The rarity of payments made by indorsing a check is reflected in the
often criticized obiter dictum of Kammergericht, November 9; 1914, 35 RxcmPnE=r.r;o
im

O0B

SmAN
CsorcwrE
7, which said that a payee who indorses a check instead of

collecting it, acts negligently.
120. See Amtsgericht Dresden, Februa y 15, 1927, 56 JumsrTscim
1144. Contra: Landgericht Wuerzburg, February 27, 1925, 55 JuRsisrscn

Wocxiscmur
Wocra;.scw=x-rr

72.
The German law, on this point, will not be clearly settled until the Reichsgericht has
again passed on the problem. It has not done so during the last thirty years. Neither
Neumanns Jahrbuecher, nor textbooks, nor the recent dissertation of Wasm, DAs EnroEs
trra;
DES SCaaTLDVERHAEMTNISES DURCH WECHsELBE EBUNG (1922) give recent decisions of the

German Reichsgericht.
121. Where the instrument is given for a present debt, there may be a presumption of
absolute payment. Note 6 supra. The question was not raised in any of the cases supporting the text following.
122. Foote v. Brown, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4909 (C. C. D. Ind. 1841); Hunter v. Moul,
98 Pa. 13 (1881); Holmes & Sons v. Briggs and Drum, 131 Pa. 233, 18 AUt. 928 (1890);
Curtis v. Douglas, 79 Tex. 167, 15 S. W. 154 (1890). In England, the caes prior to
Smith v. Mfercer, L. R. 3 Ex. 51 (1867) held that the debtor, not being a party, was not
entitled to notice of dishonor. Bishop v. Rowe, 3 M. & S. 362 (K. B. 1815); Svinyard v.
Bowes, 5 M. & S. 62 (K. B. 1816); Holbrow v. Wilkins, 1 Barn. & C. 10 (K. B. 1i22);
Van Wart v. Wooley, 3 Barn. & C. 439 (K. B. 1824). Nor to a demand on the primary
party. Goodwin v. Coates, 1 M. & Rob. 221 (N. P. 1832).
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creditor. 12 3

when the debtor has been injured by the laches of the
However, such injury to the debtor seldom results because he is generally
possessed of a right of action against the third party. In these cases,
however, it may be as difficult to measure damages as in the cases where
the debtor is an indorser. It is somewhat paradoxical moreover, as
was indicated by Baron Bramwell in Smith v. Mercer,'" to hold a debtor
who has merely delivered an instrument to greater liability than one
who has indorsed it, and accordingly he held that the debtor who delivers
a third party's instrument will be totally discharged if the creditor is
guilty of laches. The doctrine of Smith v. Mercer, however, was shortlived. Sir John Stuart, two years later in Re British and American
Steam Navigation Co., professed himself unable to follow Baron Brainwell's reasoning, and refused to discharge the debtor when no injury
was apparent. 2 5
III
It should now be obvious that payment by negotiable instrument has
its complications, especially where the creditor who has taken an instrument has been guilty of laches. The time has come to resolve the
plot and draw what moral lessons, if any, are implicit in it.
In the Anglo-American, German, and French law, payment by bill,
note, or check is presumptively conditional. The underlying obligation
subsists, but its enforcement is in effect suspended until the maturity
of the instrument. The three systems, however, present different solutions for the problems raised by a creditor's laches. In Germany, the
creditor may fall back on the underlying obligation, subject to the
debtor's counterclaim for damages. Where the debtor is an indorser,
this damage theory necessitates a string of successive suits back to the
drawee, and the difficulties are further increased if one of the prior
parties has been damaged by the laches. The French law permits the
holder to recover against the drawer to the extent that the drawer has
been unjustly enriched, unless the drawer can show that he had sufficient
123. Anderson v. Timberlake, 114 Ala. 377, 22 So. 431 (1897); Kennedy v. Jones,
140 Ga. 302, 78 S. E. 1069 (1913) ; Fritz v. Kennedy, 119 Iowa 628, 93 N. W. 603 (1903) ;
Grubbe v. Stifle, 61 Mo. 473 (1875); Williams v. Brown, 53 App. Div. 486, 65 N. Y.
Supp. 1049 (1900); Hunter v. Moul, 98 Pa. 13 (1881); Kilpatrick v. Home B. & L. Ass'n.,
119 Pa. 30, 12 AUt. 754 (1888); Holmes & Sons v. Briggs and Drum, 131 Pa. 233, 18 Atl.

928 (1890); Wessel v. Montgomery, 106 Pa. Super. 341, 163 Ati. 347 (1932); Manitoba
Mortgage and Investment Co. v. Weiss, 18 S. D. 459, 101 N. W. 37 (1904). Cf. Boardman v. Steele, 13 Conn. 547 (1840); Camidge v. Allenby, 5 L. J. 95 (K. B. 1827); Hopkins
v. Ware, L. R. 4 Ex. 268 (1869).
124. L. R. 3 Fx. 51 i(1967), discussed note 122 supra.
125. L. R. 8 Eq. 506 (1869).

Neither the court decisions nor the textwriters in either Germany or France deal with
the fourth variation. If a case should arise in Germany there is reason to believe that a
court would follow the damage theory.
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funds with the drawee at maturity. And where the drawer did have sufficient funds, the holder acquires an additional right of action directly
against the drawee, under the provisiondoctrine. In Anglo-American law,
the drawer of a check is discharged on the check and on the underlying
obligation, although, theoretically, only to the extent that the debtor has
been injured by the creditor's laches; the indorser of a check is probably
completely discharged. The drawer and indorsers of a bill, and the
indorsers of a promissory note are generally held completely discharged
on the instrument and on the debt, irrespective of damage.
The Anglo-American law deals too harshly with the creditor. The
German solution of the problem, on the other hand, is practicable only
where the debtor is drawer; otherwise it may lead into great practical
difficulties, as when there are many indorsements, and the debtor is the
last indorser. At best, it forces the creditor-indorsee to fall back on
his debtor-indorser and the latter on his debtor and so forth until the
parties ultimately liable (either the drawer or the drawee) are reached.
To avoid this result, the creditor should be denied any right of recovery
against an indorser.
The French law which allows the creditor, whether he be indorsee or
payee, (by means of an action for unjust enrichment) to cut through
and reach the drawer who has no funds with the drawee at maturity
is sound principle. But since this unjust enrichment action is needed
only when the instrument is unaccepted, because in such a case, the
creditor, who has been guilty of laches, has no other means of satisfying
his claim, the French rule which allows the action for unjust enrichment
even against the drawer of an accepted bill, should not be followed.
Similarly, the rule which appropriates to the holder the claim which
the debtor-drawer had against the drawee, for funds on deposit, for
example, should not be followed, because the holder would thereby be
given an unmerited preference over the other creditors of the drawer
in the event of the latter's insolvency.
An unjust enrichment action thus limited could be fitted into the
Anglo-American system. But, before we proceed further, we must discover whether or not the creditor who is guilty of laches may be already
sufficiently protected, for in such a case, it would not be necessary to
improve his position by developing an action based on unjust enrichment.
The creditor, even if he has been guilty of laches, will be protected
if it can be said that the drawer of the bill or check has assigned to
the holder his claim against the drawee. The assignment need not be
effective between the holder and the drawee, but there should be an
effective assignment between the holder and the drawer.'" 0 Where such
126. Merchants National Bank v. State Bank, 172 Mlinn. 24, 214 N. W. 750 (1927);
Hawes v. Blackwel, 107 N. E. 196, 12 S. E. 245 (1890); Central Trust Co. v. Bank of
Mufllens, 108 W. Va. 12, 150 S. E. 137 (1929).
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an assignment is found to exist, the holder's laches on the instrument
does not affect his right against the drawee. But according to the majority view at common law, and now under the Bills of Exchange Act and
the Negotiable Instruments Law, neither a bill nor a check is in itself
such an assignment. 27 It is possible to show facts extrinsic to the
instrument which will raise an implied in fact assignment. The fiction
is applied when a check is drawn for the full amount of the drawer's
claim against the bank,'2 or if the court finds that "the parties must
have and did intend to create a particular appropriation, charge or lien
on the property upon the faith of which they both dealt." In Fourth
Street Bank v. Yardley, Mr. Justice White found there was such a
particular appropriation, when a bank, which had been loaned money
on the strength of its assertion that it had a credit of $27,000 in a
New York bank, drew a draft on the latter bank for $25,000 to repay
the holder. The reliance of the holder on this particular credit was said
to give him a right to the fund prior to that of the drawer's, receiver.
The result, it seems, would have been the same even if the holder had
been guilty of laches. 2 9
The creditor may in addition gain a direct right against the drawee
on the theory of an implied acceptance. If the drawee retains the bill
or check for twenty-four hours notwithstanding a demand for its
return,13 0 and possibly even without demand,' he is deemed to have
impliedly accepted the instrument. When a bank knows that it is being
drawn upon for the purpose of paying an unpaid seller, and the funds
from the resale of the chattel later come into its possession, the bank
is held directly liable to the seller.' 32 In such cases, the drawee is said
127. Bills of Exchange Act, supra note 67, § 53 (1); N. I. L. § 127, 189; Hopkingon v.
Forster, L. R. 19 Eq. 74 (1873); Schroeder v. Central Bank of London, 34 L, T. R, 735
(C. P. 1876); Kaesmeyer v. Smith, 22 Idaho 1, 123 Pac. 943 (1912); Leach v. Mechanics
Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 899, 211 N. E. 506 (1926); Love v. Ardmore Stock Exchange,
67 L. R. A. 617 (Ind. Terr. C. A. 1904); Jones v. Crumpler, 119 Va. 143, 89 S. E, 232
(1916); Bowker v. Haight, 146 Fed. 257 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906). The dissenting opinion
in Leach v. Mechanics Savings Bank, supra, points out the incongruity, in that the holder
must suffer loss when he is guilty of laches on a check, and yet, where the drawer becomes
insolvent, the holder loses the benefit of the drawee's solvency.
128. Dunlop v. Commercial National Bank, 50 Cal. App. 476, 195 Pac. 688 (1921);
First National Bank v. O'Byrne, 177 Ill. App. 473 (1913).
129. Fourth Street Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634, 651 (1897).
130. N. I. L. § 137.
131. Miller v. Farmers State Bank of Arco, 165 Minn. 339, 206 N. W. 930 (1925);
State Bank v. Weiss, 46 Misc. 93, 91 N. Y. Supp. 276 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Dawson & White
v. National Bank of Greenville, 196 N. C. 135, 144 S. E. 833 (1928); Wisner v, First
Nat. Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 955 (1908); Peoples Nat. Bank v. Swift, 134 Tenn. 175,

183 S.W. 725 (1916). See Feezer, Acceptance of Bills of Exchange by Conduct (1927)
12 MnxN. L. Rav. 129.
132. State v. Trimble, 316 Mo. 354, 289 S.W. 796 (1926); First National Bank v,
Griffin, 31 Okla. 382, 120 Pac. 595 (1912). The result follows even though the seller was
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impliedly to accept "not because he has in fact done so but because
justice requires that he be presumed to have accepted it and because
there are present the elements of estoppel.""
In the absence of a finding of assignment or acceptance, the AngloAmerican law leaves the holder in a disadvantageous position, and if
he is to be protected, it becomes necessary to return to the unjust
enrichment concept. Mr. Justice Story, it may be remembered, in
The Matter of Brown, felt that it would be inequitable to allow the
drawer of a check to be discharged when there had been no injury.
In speaking of the drawer who had claimed his discharge, Story asked
this question: "In such a case can it be said with truth or justice, that
he is to be enriched at the expense of the holder of the check? Or,
that he shall not be deemed to hold the money, as money had and
received for the use of the holder, either because he had not funds in
the bank, or because he still retains those funds, appropriated to the
use of another, for his own use?"'2 4 It would seem that the drawer
of a bill, as well as of a check, might be deemed to hold the money
he had received, or claim which he still has against the drawee, for the
benefit of the holder, and that an unjust enrichment action should lie
against the drawer to the extent that such funds or claim is in excess
over the damage caused by the holder's laches.
If one may attempt to prophesy how the law may develop, it may
be suggested that an unjust enrichment action will be established in
the negligent creditor's favor first against a debtor-drawer who has
collected from, or who has a claim against, a solvent drawee. It will
probably be less difficult for the court to allow this action if the drawer
has collected from the drawee than to require the drawer who has not
collected to hold his claim against an insolvent drawee in trust for the
holder. It may be suggested that such development will originate in
cases where the facts are obscure or peculiar, and sufficiently different
from the ordinary case to encourage the court to inspect the problem
in a new light. Two such cases may have already arisen.
In Fisherv. Farmers'Co-op. Irr.Co., Ltd.,2 5 the Farmers' Co-operative
Irrigation Company borrowed $500 from the Farmers' State Bank of
New Plymouth, giving in return a negotiable promissory note. The
perhaps guilty of Iaches. Thomas v. Farmers National Bank, 217 S. W. 860 (Mo. App.
1920). It would seem that the same reasoning would give the holder Eeller a right
against a drawer who received dividends from the drawee bank. See York v. Farmers
Bank of Garden City, 105 Alo. App. 127, 79 S. W. 968 (1904); cf. Oldridge v. Sutton,
157 Mlo. App. 485, 137 S. W. 994 (1911).
133. Feezer, supra note 131, at 143.
134. 2 Story Rep. 502, 517 (C. C. Mlass. 1843). The same reasoning was tued in
Hoyt v. Seeley, 18 Conn. 352, 356 (1847). See (1926) 40 HAv. L. REv. 128.
135. 49 Idaho 343, 288 Pac. 164 (1930).
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treasurer of the Irrigation Company was also president of the bank.
The Irrigation Company paid its debts by issuing a "warrant" addressed
to the treasurer. Such warrants were accepted and treated by the bank
as checks. When the note in issue was presented for payment, the
Irrigation Company gave the Farmers' State Bank a warrant according
to its usual practice. If the warrant was treated as a check, the Irrigation Company was, in effect, giving the bank a check drawn upon the
same bank. Meanwhile one Fisher had sent $500 to the Farmers' State
Bank for the purpose either of loaning this money to the Irrigation
Company or buying one of the Irrigation Company's obligations. And
the note when presented by the bank had the name of the bank as payee
crossed out and the name of Fisher substituted. The bank in taking
the warrant or check, drawn upon itself, therefore, may have been acting
as the agent for Fisher. In any event, the bank received the warrant
on January 3rd, at which time the Irrigation Company had sufficient
deposits with the bank to have paid the warrant. The bank, however,
did not cash the warrant, that is, it failed to debit the Irrigation Company's account. On January 7th, the bank closed and was taken over
by the state liquidator who sent the warrant to Fisher. Fisher demanded
payment of the Irrigation Company, and upon refusal, brought an action
against it on the warrant. The court held that the bank was negligent
in not collecting, and that this negligence (or laches) was chargeable to
Fisher; but since the Irrigation Company had been paid a liquidating
dividend of forty per cent on its account with the insolvent bank, judgment should be given against the Irrigation Company for forty per cent
of the face value of the warrant together with interest from the date
of payment.
The court in deciding the case did assume that the warrant was a
check; that the bank was the collecting agent for Fisher; and that the
bank was negligent. But the fact remains that it appeared to have no
difficulty in giving judgment against the Irrigation Company for the
amount actually received by it from the bank. Furthermore, the court
gave no theory for its decision and if the result is not based on the
pro tanto rule in Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, (and
the dubious nature of a warrant as a check makes it extremely likely
that the court could not have applied Section 186) the decisive element
of the case appears to be unjust enrichment.
In Hawes v. Blackwell, 8 6 a check drawn on November 10th, reached
the plaintiff on November 12th, and was not presented until November
16th. On November 13th, however, the drawee had made an assignment
for the benefit of creditors. Whether there was laches in presentment
of the check is not found. But the holder of the check was allowed to
136.

107 N. C. 196, 12 S. E. 245. (1890).
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sue the trustees of the drawer and the trustees of the drawee together,
and to get an order that dividends paid out of the insolvent drawee
bank were to be applied pro rata to the holder's judgment against the
drawer. The effect of the decision was that the drawer held his cause
of action against the drawee in trust for the holder.
Neither Fisher v. Farmers' Co-Op. Irr. Co. Ltd., nor Hawes v. Blackwell, is particularly convincing. Yet they may have in them the first
stirrings of a general action founded on elements of unjust enrichment.
The unjust enrichment action, it must be noted, would lie against the
drawer in every case, whether or not he is the debtor on the underlying
obligation. It would not lie, therefore, against the indorser even though
he is the debtor, but directly against the drawer who has been unjustly
enriched. It would not solve the difficulty of determining the amount
of unjust enrichment where the drawer complains that he has been injured
because someone against whom he had a right of reimbursement has
become insolvent during the laches period. The court could, of course,
avoid the difficulty by requiring the drawer to hold his claim against
the insolvent for the benefit of the holder, and in that way, escape the
necessity of liquidating damages based on future dividends. Even so,
it might be unwise to declare such a constructive trust in any case save
where the insolvent is the drawee.
Several amendments have been proposed to the Negotiable Instruments
Law to remedy some of the obvious defects in the Anglo-American
system which have been pointed out. These amendments, however, deal
only with checks despite the fact that the rule for discharge as regards
checks has been developed to a more sensible stage than the corresponding rule with respect to bills. 37 It is suggested, therefore, that the
unjust, enrichment action be codified to cover both bills and checks and
to cover the situation in which the drawee becomes insolvent during the
period of laches. The following amendment is accordingly proposed:
"The holder of an unaccepted bill of exchange or of an uncertified check
who fails to make due presentment or give due notice of dishonor as
required, acquires a claim against the drawer to the extent the drawer
would be unjustly enriched if discharged, with the exception that if the
drawer has suffered injury through the insolvency of the drawee after
presentment should have been made or notice of dishonor given, the holder
will acquire instead the drawer's rights against the drawee to the amount
of the bill or check."
137. See e. g. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON'XEaxcn OF COMMSOMES ON Uz23FOnRM
STATE LAws AND PRocEEDiNGs (1933) 204; (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 444, 4S0, n. 2S.
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